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Forward 
 
Supporting students from all backgrounds to be able to access further and higher 
education is a vital component of our world class education system and the Student 
Loans Company plays an integral role in enabling this.  
The SLC as an organisation is unrecognisable from its inception in 1989. From one 
maintenance loan product offered to all UK students, to over 25 loans and grants 
with 86 different variants, from fewer than 100 staff to over 3000, from 180,000 
customers to over 8.5 million. The scale of expansion is clear, and unsurprisingly, 
the SLC has had a number of successes and challenges along the way. 
Since 2010-11, customer satisfaction rates for applicants have increased from 70.5% 
to 83.1%, and Higher Education funding applications assessed within 20 days of 
submission have increased from 72.6% to 94.5%. 
In 2018-19, the SLC processed 2 million applications, made over 7 million payments 
and handled over 6 million telephone calls. 99.7% of students who submitted their 
applications on time had their funds in place for the start of term and the SLC 
received just 2.48 complaints per 10,000 applicants and 0.84 complaints per 10,000 
repayment customers. This is particularly impressive when set against industry 
averages.  
Of the 43 performance targets it was formally set by shareholders, it achieved or 
exceeded 38.   
The SLC has also achieved a number of notable accomplishments including being 
named as an ‘Exemplar’ Digital Delivery Programme by the Government Digital 
Service, implementing new 24+ Advanced Learning Loans and Postgraduate 
Masters Loans and effectively supporting the first 2 loan book sales. 
This impressive progress, however, has not been without its challenges and it is 
widely recognised that the SLC still faces an efficiency gap. Its IT systems are 
outdated and drive complexity and cost. Its staffing, both at the front line and 
leadership level, has faced instability and high levels of churn over recent years. The 
process for developing new products and services is not as efficient as it could be 
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and often results in delays and products that need subsequent changes and 
upgrades.  
So whilst the SLC is meeting the majority of its targets, it could still improve the 
customer service and value for money it provides. Previous attempts at addressing 
these issues have not fully resolved them. However, the lessons learned are being 
used to shape a new Transformation Programme that should make it easier, quicker, 
safer and cheaper for the SLC and its government partners to run the student 
financing system. The recommendations in this Review are focused on developing 
the enabling environment for such a transformation. 
Given the expected rise in student numbers in the years to come, the ambitious new 
suite of recommendations put forward by Dr Philip Augar’s recent independent panel 
report (‘the Augar Review’), and the constant level of digital innovation, it is vital that 
the SLC is supported to be the best that it can be, maintaining a high quality student 
finance system as a key plank of our world class higher education system.    
 
Chris Skidmore 
Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Glossary of Abbreviations 
ADG: Adult Dependants’ Grant 
 
ALBs: Arm’s-Length Bodies 
 
APRA: Annual Performance and Resource Agreement 
 
AY: Academic Year 
 
BAU: Business as usual 
 
CCG: Childcare Grant 
 
CCS: Crown Commercial Service 
 
DAs: Devolved Administrations 
 
DfE:  Department for Education 
 
DSA: Disabled Students’ Allowance 
 
ELT: Executive Leadership Team 
 
FY: Financial Year 
 
GDS: Government Digital Service  
 
SLC: Student Loans Company 
 
FEPs: Further Education Providers 
 
GovCo: Government Company 
 
HEIs: Higher Education Institutions 
 
KBOs:  Key Business Objectives 
 
KPIs: Key Performance Indicators 
 
NEDs: Non-Executive Directors 
 
NDPB: Non-Departmental Public Body 
 
OfS: Office for Students 
 
PLA: Parents’ Learning Allowance 
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SFE: Student Finance England 
 
SFNi: Student Finance Northern Ireland 
 
SFS: Student Finance Scotland  
 
SFW: Student Finance Wales 
 
UCAS: Universities and Colleges Admissions Service 
 
UKGI: UK Government Investments 
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1.3 Review Scope 
As a Non-Departmental Public Body sponsored by DfE, the SLC is required under 
Cabinet Office guidelines to undergo a Tailored Review at least once every 
parliament1. This is the first such review for the SLC.   
The principal aims of a Tailored Review are to ensure that public bodies remain fit for 
purpose, are well governed and properly accountable for what they do. The Reviews 
are intended to:  
• provide a robust challenge to and assurance on the continuing need for
individual organisations, both in function and form; and
• where it is agreed that an organisation should be retained, review its capacity
for delivering more effectively and efficiently, including identifying the potential
for efficiency savings, complying with the principles of good governance, and
where appropriate, any alternative delivery models.
This review is structured into three sections: 
i. An assessment of how the SLC is operating in terms of its form and function,
governance, effectiveness, and efficiency.
ii. An overview of key factors and trends that are likely to impact how the SLC
operates in the years to come.
iii. An outline of recommendations to improve the operational and strategic
outcomes for the SLC over the next 3 to 5 years.
As the SLC is a major delivery body serving a large customer cohort and managing a 
significant asset base, this Tailored Review is classified as Tier 1. In accordance with 
Cabinet Office guidelines, this review has had the governance of both a Challenge 
Panel and a Steering Group to test the emerging analysis and provide insight and 
feedback on the recommendation. Each group met 3 times and their membership is 
outlined in Annex B. 
The review has been conducted over 7 months by an independent team based at DfE, 
with contribution and support from the SLC and other key stakeholders. A list of all 
those interviewed is provided in Annex B. The review has gathered evidence in a range 
of ways including:  
• desk based analysis of a number of sources and reviews
• engagement with the SLC (in the form of site visits, Board observations and
interviews)
1 Tailored Reviews: Guidance on Review of Public Bodies 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/802961/Tailored_Review_Guidance_on_public_bodies_-May-2019.pdf
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• interviews with a wide range of stakeholders and functional leads 
• testing with the Steering Group 
• testing with the Challenge Panel  
The terms of reference for the review is included in Annex A. 
The review team would like to put on record their thanks to the SLC Chair, Chief 
Executive and senior management team for their engagement with the review, and 
to the staff who facilitated meetings and responded to requests for information. 
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1.4 Executive Summary 
The Tailored Review 
 
The Tailored Review of the Student Loans Company (SLC) was launched in October 
2018 and announced in a Written Ministerial Statement in both Houses on 21st 
November 2018 by Ministers from the Department for Education (DfE). 
 
Tailored Reviews are part of the Cabinet Office’s public bodies reform programme. 
They seek to review the functions, form, performance, and governance arrangements 
of public bodies to ensure that they remain fit for purpose, are well governed and 
properly accountable for what they do. 
 
The SLC is a non-profit making Government-owned company (GovCo), which pays 
loans and grants to students, universities and colleges in the UK. As a Non-
Department Public Body (NDPB) sponsored by DfE, the SLC is required to undergo a 
Tailored Review at least once in every parliament.  
As this is a Tier 1 Review, an independent Challenge Panel, chaired by a DfE Non-
Executive Director, was used to examine and challenge the findings at all stages of 
the Review. 
The Review is split into 4 chapters, covering: 
Chapter 1: An introduction including a glossary, figure list, review scope and 
executive summary. 
Chapter 2: An assessment of the current ‘operational health’ of the SLC, reviewing 
its form, function, governance, effectiveness and efficiency, including 
recommendation summaries at the end of each section. 
Chapter 3: An analysis of the contextual factors likely to impact the SLC over the 
next 5-10 years including the Post-18 Review, EU exit, loan sales, 
technological developments, constitutional issues and changes to the 
claimant and customer base.  
Chapter 4: An assessment of ways to optimise the SLC, providing 
recommendations to complement and enhance activities in preparation 
for the SLC’s own Transformation Programme. 
 
Main Findings 
 
Section 2.1 Form and Function 
 
This section provides an overview of the SLC, its purpose, structure and main 
functions. It explores the impact of the growth of products and functions that the SLC 
has taken on since its inception 30 years ago.  
 
The Review notes that there is broad consensus that the 4 key functions of the SLC - 
processing applications, making assessments, paying individuals and institutions and 
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collecting repayments - continue to be integral to the role that government plays in 
supporting students through Further and Higher Education. 
Cabinet Office guidance is used to assess the form of the SLC against 3 tests; 
technical function, political impartiality and establishing facts and/or figures with 
integrity. Given that the SLC operates a technical level of expertise, it passes at least 
one of the tests for being classified as an NDPB. It concludes that despite some 
concerns around the SLC’s status as both a GovCo and NDPB, the majority of these 
challenges are centred around governance and leadership, and will not be resolved 
simply by changing the organisational status or form of the SLC at this time. 
Finally, this section examines the public perception of the SLC and notes that the 
Augar Review has concluded that the current terminology used to describe student 
finance (loans, debt, interest, liability etc.) can be unhelpful and misleading, including 
the SLC’s name.  
Section 2.2 Governance 
This section examines the overall governance structure of the SLC including 
ministerial responsibilities, shareholder structure, the Sponsorship team, the 
Executive Leadership team and the Board. 
It recognises that the SLC and its governance partners have improved various aspects 
of its governance including a refreshed Framework document, new CEO and CFO, a 
widening of the remit of key Committees and the recent recruitment of 2 new NEDs.  
It is noted, however, that there remains a tension in the role of the Board and that 
improvements in risk management and long term strategic management are required.  
Section 2.3 Effectiveness 
This section explores the SLC’s performance against its objectives and operational 
targets. It recognises the Company’s accomplishment of meeting the majority of its 
targets with relatively low customer complaints, despite delivering in an environment 
of increasing scale, scope and complexity. 
The Review notes a number of challenges for the SLC’s effectiveness, including high 
levels of management churn, a complex policy commissioning process, historically 
unfocused KPIs, under developed strategic vision and increasing pressure on 
repayments and loan sale support servicing.  
A brief overview of improvement activities is outlined, including a focus on the SLC’s 
refreshed Transformation Programme, which would involve significant investment 
over several years for which the SLC is currently seeking Treasury approval. 
Application of this activity with a revamped policy commissioning cycle will be crucial 
for improving effectiveness. 
Section 2.4 Efficiency 
This section explores the growth in the SLC’s financial spend and projections, 
alongside its commercial practices and key processes for identifying fraud and error. 
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It also investigates the SLC’s current technology and digital platforms, concluding that 
despite some incremental improvements, the SLC will need to address the pressing 
issue of its overwhelmed and outdated IT infrastructure, as well as growing its 
diagnostics and data management capabilities. This is especially important given the 
new policy initiatives that may come on stream from the Post-18 Review, increasing 
devolved divergence and portfolio changes. 
 
The Review notes the SLC has had recent success in securing pay upgrades for its 
lowest paid staff but needs to make significant inroads into embedding a 
comprehensive People Strategy to offer a more competitive package in support of 
recruitment and retention.  
The SLC’s Transformation Programme, if approved and successfully implemented, 
should help to resolve many of these issues, enabling the company to deliver changes 
much more quickly, safely and cost effectively.   
Section 3 Contextual Factors 
The analysis of the contextual factors likely to impact the SLC over the next 5-10 years 
include the Post-18 Review, EU exit, loan sales, technological developments, 
constitutional issues and changes to the claimant and customer base. 
The Review concludes that the SLC appears to be preparing relatively well for an 
impending EU exit, with contingencies for ‘no deal’ and ‘deal’ scenarios. It has also 
made good progress on improving data sharing and GDPR compliance. 
 
The growth in student numbers, more complex working patterns, increase in the loan 
book size and continuance of loan book sales will mean that strengthening the SLC’s 
strategic and technological capabilities in support of repayments and loan sale 
servicing will grow in importance.  
 
Shoring up the SLC’s effectiveness and efficiency, particularly in its IT and business 
functions, will also be a vital enabler for any Post-18 reforms and to combat ever 
developing cyber security threats.   
 
Main recommendations 
This report contains 39 individual recommendations for both the SLC and its 
governance partners. All recommendations can be found in Chapter 4, with linked 
summary recommendation boxes at the end of each section. 
The recommendations cover a number of areas which are grouped into the 4 
categories below, with the most significant focused on: 
- Embedding refreshed key business objectives;  
- Transforming the policy commissioning cycle;  
- Delivering the Transformation Programme aimed at improving staff 
retention and stabilising IT and data systems;  
- Conducting feasibility studies on transferring repayments to HMRC and 
future loan sale servicing options; and  
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- Improving governance practices whilst maintaining the SLC’s status as a 
GovCo NDPB for the next 3-5 years. 
 
Optimisation of leadership 
The recommendations around the optimisation of leadership focus on reforming the 
policy commissioning cycle in order to provide improved effectiveness and efficiency 
for the development of new products and business processes.  
These recommendations also highlight the need to strengthen the overall vision and 
forward strategy for the Company, establishing robust project management for the 
Transformation Programme and embedding improvements in loan sale support 
servicing. 
Clarity of governance  
These recommendations emphasise the ongoing need for the SLC to streamline and 
clarify governance arrangements between the board, executive leadership team, 
shareholders and sponsors, with a particular focus on improved risk management and 
strategic oversight. With regards to the SLC’s form and function, it is recommended 
that the SLC should remain a GovCo NDPB while it focuses on delivering the 
Transformation Programme, with more radical structural changes possible in the 
medium to long term future once systems are more stable and new policy initiatives 
better understood.  
Stabilisation of systems 
Recognising that there are a number of planned activities already in train under 
stabilisation of systems, these recommendations focus on creating an enabling 
environment for the Transformation Programme which seeks to address inadequacies 
in staffing, IT and business architecture. It also recommends a continuation of the 
current functional model (with a more strategic commercial outsourcing approach for 
IT and back office functions, and potential streamlining of targeted grants), alongside 
feasibility testing for establishing a separate Asset Company to manage loan sale 
support servicing for future sales. 
 
Future options 
While the scope of this Tailored Review is focused on changes that can be feasibly 
delivered in the next 3-5 years, the final set of recommendations reflect on additional 
opportunities to deliver wider benefits over a longer time horizon.  
These include exploring the possibility of moving the administration of repayments in 
whole to HMRC, the appropriateness of a name change for the SLC and 
recommending that that the next Tailored Review should be conducted in 3 years 
(rather than 5 years), once the implications of EU Exit and the Post-18 Review have 
been more clearly established. 
Next Steps 
The Sponsorship Team, in partnership with the SLC, should produce a plan to take 
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forward these recommendations. This should include monitoring progress to ensure 
that shareholders are actively engaged in implementation, reporting to the sponsor 
Director. 
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Chapter 2: How is the SLC currently functioning? 
2.1 Form and Function 
Purpose of the SLC 
The Student Loans Company (SLC) is a non-profit Government-owned company 
(GovCo) and Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB), set up to pay loans and grants 
to students, universities and colleges in the UK on behalf of its 4 shareholders.  
 
The specific responsibilities of the SLC are to: 
• make payments to individuals, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and Further 
Education Providers (FEPs) in accordance with the student support regulations 
and relevant public policy objectives; 
• ensure that repayments (whether through HMRC or direct to the SLC) are 
collected on time from those due to repay;  
• provide accurate and timely information to students/customers and to inform 
the shareholders’ policy making and analysis; and 
• perform related activities to assist in achieving the Departments’ policy 
objectives as required. 
 
The SLC’s mission is to ‘enable people to invest in their futures through further and 
higher education by providing trusted, transparent, flexible and accessible student 
finance services’. This is working towards a vision were the ‘SLC is widely recognised 
as enabling student opportunity and delivering an outstanding customer experience in 
the efficient delivery of the four UK governments’ further and higher education finance 
policies’.  
Structure of SLC 
The SLC currently has nearly 3500 employees and administers a student loan book 
totalling more than £135bn.   
 
The SLC is a both a GovCo and a NDPB, meaning that it is both:  
• a government-owned company, a legal entity that undertakes commercial 
activities on behalf of its government shareholders; and  
• a body that has a role in the processes of national government - but is not a 
government department or part of one - and which accordingly operates to a 
greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers (though a minister will be 
responsible to Parliament for that NDPB, and will appoint the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Chair and Non-Executive Directors (NEDs)). 
The SLC is managed by a CEO, has a Board and, as a company, has 4 shareholders: 
DfE (85%), Advanced Learning and Science Directorate, Scotland (5%), Skills, Higher 
Education & Lifelong Learning, Wales (5%) and the Department of the Economy, 
Northern Ireland (5%). This structure has been in place since 2013. 
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The SLC is located at 5 sites across the UK, 3 in Glasgow (Bothwell Street, 
Hillington and Europa House), 1 in Darlington and 1 at Llandudno Junction. They 
also have access to office space in Finlaison House, London. 
 
Figure 1: SLC Shareholder Schematic 
Source: UK Government Investments (UKGI) 
 
Brief history of the SLC 
The SLC was set up as a Company Limited by Shares under the Companies Act, 
originally constructed to be owned by 4 UK banks to provide mortgage-style loans2 
regulated by the relevant consumer lending acts. It was incorporated in 1989 and 
began operating in 1990. When the arrangement with the 4 UK banks fell through, the 
English and Scottish governments agreed to be joint shareholders of the organisation 
(since extended to Wales and Northern Ireland). The SLC has been classified as an 
executive NDPB since 1996 and now supports the strategic aims of all 4 devolved 
administrations (DAs). 
The role of the SLC has changed significantly from its inception 30 years ago - when 
2 Loans with a fixed repayment rate, regardless of income 
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it provided a basic non-means tested loan service for higher education students - with 
a marked increase in the scale and complexity of its current product and functions, 
particularly in the last 7 years. For example, the variation of products has increased 
from approximately 46 in AY 2012/3 to over 86 in AY 2018/19. The addition of 
supporting the sales of parts of the student loan book has also added extra 
functionality, putting additional pressures on a system which was not structured to 
carry out the vast role it is now commissioned to undertake. 
 
 
            
        Figure 2: Timeline of key SLC events from 1989 
Source: SLC 
 
 
Core functions and services of the SLC 
The SLC services around 2 million applications per year and has 8.5 million 
customers.  
 
SLC broadly provides 4 main functions;  
1. Apply: the receipt and processing of the initial application for a loan or grant 
from the student 
2. Assess: the process of assessing the applicant’s eligibility and entitlement to 
the various student support products available  
3. Pay: the payment of the loan or grant to the student/institution/provider 
4. Repay: the recovery of the loan, based on the income of the repayer 
 
For England and Wales, the SLC manages the full, end-to-end process, for Scotland 
(for loans) and Northern Ireland it provides the payment and repayment parts only, 
although Northern Ireland uses SLC-developed systems for assessing their students’ 
applications. 
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Table 1: List of processes and sub processes 
Source: SLC 
 
It is important to note that in addition to the services for students and those repaying 
loans, the SLC directly distributes funding to HEIs and FEPs and this forms a crucial 
component of the funding structure for these institutions, for which they currently do 
not pay any direct administration fees or have any formal service level agreements 
with the SLC.  In England in 2016/17, the total income to the HEI sector was £30 
billion. Of this, the three largest contributions were £10.9 billion from home/EU tuition 
fees, £1.3 billion from the teaching grant and £4 billion from international students. 
This means that monies paid out by the SLC comprise the largest proportion of the 
total income for the majority of HEIs. 
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Figure 3: HEI funding in England 2016/17 
Source: DFE analysis 
 
The SLC also manages a growing range of Further Education and Postgraduate 
products and services which are tailored to the differing requirements of individual 
government administrations, alongside various targeted support grants designed to 
enable students with disabilities, childcare or other needs to overcome barriers to 
participation in higher and further education. For AY 2018/2019 the SLC provided 25 
active products (with 86 variations). The trend has been for product numbers and 
variations of products to increase without retiring older products. The SLC also 
administers bursary payments on behalf of UK education providers. 
 
 
Table 2: The SLC’s product range for AY 2018-19 (ICR – Income Contingent Repayment) 
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Source: SLC  
An independent study3 conducted for the SLC highlighted that there are significant 
costs driven by the complexity of product variants and policy rules. As highlighted in 
table 3, a notable proportion of these costs are derived from targeted grant payments, 
with Disabled Students’ Allowance (DSA) and Grants for Dependants (GfD) having the 
highest unit costs.  
 
Table 3: Costs by product group 
Source: SLC 
 
Disabled Students’ Allowances 
 
DSAs provide funding for specialist support, such as equipment, software, non-
medical help (i.e. personal support) and travel for disabled students in higher 
education. The number of students declaring a disability at English HEIs has risen by 
25% from 183,005 in AY 2012/13 to 229,470 in AY 2016/17. 
 
The SLC currently determines students’ eligibility and enables eligible students to have 
their needs assessed through a network of assessment centres. The SLC then 
ensures that the support recommended in the assessments is provided to students, 
                                            
 
3 Cost of Complexity, McKinsey & Company, 2017 
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and directly pays the providers of those goods and services. DSA evaluation research 
published in January 2019 shows that overall, students are positive about the support 
they get via DSAs, including how their needs are assessed. The research also shows, 
however, that students find some parts of the application process problematic (e.g. 
providing suitable evidence) and that some also found difficulties in accessing the 
support recommended for them. The application process takes on average 14 weeks 
for a student to complete, with 25% of evidence not meeting policy requirements and 
20% of needs assessment reports having insufficient information.  
Overall, whilst offering valuable support to disabled students in higher education, the 
system has a number of suboptimal elements, particularly around assessment, contact 
and payment. 
In order to address these issues, DfE Ministers have agreed the following reforms: 
i.The SLC will procure central contracts for the supply of DSA equipment and 
assessment providers. Contracts for the supply of equipment should be in place 
from autumn 2019 and for assessment services from autumn 2020. 
ii.DfE will seek the higher education and disability sectors’ views on adapting the 
DSA system so that funding for students’ non-medical help (NMH) is directed to 
higher education providers. The consultation will run over summer/early autumn 
2019 with any changes effective from AY 2021/22. Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland are also reviewing funding arrangements for disabled students and 
operational enhancements. 
iii.DfE will increase the cap on the single postgraduate DSA for academic year AY 
2019/20 from £10,993 to £20,000, and will seek to replace the separate 
postgraduate scheme in AY 2020/21 with a single product that covers both 
postgraduate and undergraduates. 
Grants for Dependants 
 
The SLC provides three means-tested grants to students from very low-income 
households with children or adult dependants: Childcare Grant (CCG), Parents’ 
Learning Allowance (PLA) and Adult Dependants’ Grant (ADG). These grants are 
available to eligible students in addition to maintenance loans. 
 
Childcare Grant 
 
Student parents can apply for a CCG if they have children in Ofsted (or equivalent) 
registered childcare.  The grant helps with childcare costs for children under 15, or 
under 17 if they have special educational needs.  The CCG is means tested and non-
repayable.  Payment covers up to 85% of child care costs with a registered provider 
throughout the academic year, i.e. during term time, short vacations and the longest 
vacation, up to a maximum amount (currently up to £169.30 per week for one child or 
£290.27 per week for two or more children). 
 
CCG Reform 
An internal government audit in 2015 identified a number of high level risks: 
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• CCG payments obtained through deception and misrepresentation; 
• Funding claimed for childcare which has not been provided; and 
• Funding not used for the purpose intended. 
•  
In order to address these issues a number of reforms have been implemented: 
i. Improvements in auditing and checks of a higher proportion of cases: 
increasing audit checks from 15% to 30% and targeting high fraud risk 
students/providers.    
ii. Introducing SLC data sharing arrangements: a data share process with HMRC 
and DWP to enable SLC to rule out double funding of childcare. 
iii. Improving information requested from providers: asking providers for the 
number of children on their childcare provider roll which could highlight any 
volume discrepancies for Ofsted registration. 
iv. Suspending payments when audit forms are not returned: not only for CCGs 
but also making a student unfit for all support if the childcare provider and 
student failed to respond to audit requests, depending on the circumstances.   
v. Paying providers direct on receipt of an invoice: implementation of an 
automated system where childcare providers and students submit information 
independently of each other and the provider is paid directly on receipt of an 
invoice. This has been successfully implemented for AY 2019/20 with the 
application process launching in February 2019. 
 
Parents Learning Allowance (PLA) 
 
Parents Learning Allowance is paid to student parents to help with learning costs other 
than childcare. Students may be eligible for up to £1,716 per annum. 
 
Adult Dependants Grant (ADG) 
 
Adult Dependants Grant is paid to help students continue to support adults who are 
financially dependent on them – usually a spouse or partner who is low paid or is 
receiving unemployment or disability benefits. 
 
Options considering the continued utility and value for money of the PLA and ADG 
have recently been put to Ministers, which will be considered in the round with 
Spending Review and Post 18 Review advice.  
Loan Sale Support 
 
In addition to administering loans and grants, the SLC also services a growing loan 
book, worth over £136.7 billion, and works in partnership with HMRC to recover 
payments through PAYE and self-assessment (approximately 85%), as well as directly 
collecting from those borrowers outside the UK tax system (or those nearing the end 
of their repayment term). It also has the additional role of providing point of sale, pre 
and post loan sale support (in partnership with DfE and UK Government Investments 
(UKGI)) for securitised student loan sales, the first and second of which were 
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completed in 2017 and 2018. These sales introduced a new asset class to the market 
and collectively raised £3.6 billion of proceeds. It is the government’s policy to continue 
with this programme of sales, targeting total proceeds of £15bn by FY 2022-23.   
 
These functions are outlined each year in the Annual Performance and Resource 
Agreement (APRA) letter, sent from DfE to the SLC’s CEO (who is also the delegated 
Accounting Officer). The letter also outlines the SLC’s allocated annual budget and a 
number of target performance indicators. 
 
 
Figure 4: SLC functions for FY 2019-20  
*Those objectives highlighted in red are areas of greater challenge for the SLC 
Source: APRA 
Are these functions still required and are they the right ones for the 
SLC? 
There is broad consensus that the 4 key functions of the SLC continue to be integral 
to the role that government plays in supporting students through Further and Higher 
Education and should be retained. However, many interviewees highlighted the fact 
that the SLC is not necessarily the only place within government (or externally) where 
these functions can or should be administered. A more in depth analysis and 
recommendations on whether the functions - for both mainstream loans and specialist 
grants - should remain within the SLC is outlined in section 4.3.  
Is a GovCo NDPB the correct form for the SLC?  
The government’s presumption is that if a public function is needed then it should be 
undertaken by a body that is democratically accountable at either national or local 
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level. A body should only exist at arm’s length from government if it meets one of three 
tests:  
 
1. It performs a technical function which needs external expertise to deliver   
2. Its activities require political impartiality   
3. It needs to act independently to establish facts  
The review team considered the SLC’s functions against these three tests. 
Test 1 - Technical function (met) 
 
All 4 main functions of the SLC (Assess, Apply, Pay and Repay), as well as loan sale 
support, are technically complex and require a significant level of operational 
expertise. The SLC has built up a functional capability to administer these functions - 
particularly in Apply, Assess and Pay – and also works with contractors to help deliver 
services, specifically in contact centre and IT support.  
Test 2 - Political impartiality (not met) 
Unlike other NDPBs such as Ofsted, which provide independent scrutiny of 
government functions, the SLC does not need to work in an environment of absolute 
political impartiality. In contrast, it is preferable for the SLC to have early exposure to 
government policies to ensure that delivery implications are properly considered and 
costed. However, it does provide services for 4 different administrations and does not 
in itself make political decisions.   
 
Test 3 - Establishing facts and/or figures with integrity (not met) 
 
Data on student finance administration does not need to be collected independently 
of government. However, there are benefits to the SLC having a degree of 
independence from Ministers in scrutinising operational effectiveness. Both GovCo 
and NDPB structures enshrine a pivotal role for an independent Board which provides 
oversight and assurance for shareholders, and which may be less robust within an 
Executive Agency structure. This independence also ensures that the Devolved 
Administrations (DAs) have, as shareholders, a ‘protected’ voice, and can feel more 
confident in the impartiality of the information that the SLC produces. 
 
In conclusion, the SLC operates a technical level of expertise and therefore passes at 
least one of the tests for being classified as an NDPB. In addition, there are benefits 
of the NDPB model including the potential for having a degree of independence and 
impartiality given the scope of operations and representation for the DAs.   
 
As well as being classified as an NDPB, the SLC is also a Government Company and 
a number of those interviewed, including members of the Board, expressed the view 
that there are challenges with this classification and company incorporation. In 
particular, there is broad consensus that the purpose, focus and agency of the Board 
is not always clearly understood, and not necessarily commensurate with typical 
Companies Act Company functions. Board members reported a sense of a tension 
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between enacting fiduciary responsibilities as laid out in the Companies Act and 
adhering to government NDPB obligations (these are provided at Annex C). 
Whilst some of the issues are inherent within this arrangement and echoed by other 
GovCo NDPBs, the majority of SLC’s challenges will not be resolved simply by 
changing its organisational status or form. In addition, the GovCo incorporation 
ensures some legal standing for the smaller shareholders (which is still feasible but 
likely to be less formalised in other types of incorporation). Crucially, in order to change 
its legal status, the SLC would need to be legally established in another manner. The 
most likely route would be either via Royal Charter, or through primary legislation, 
neither of which are currently practical.  
Governance issues are further explored in section 2.2 and a full analysis on alternative 
structures and recommendations on both governance and organisational form are 
outlined in section 4.2.   
Public perception  
Despite delivering the vast majority of its performance targets – including relatively 
high customer satisfaction rates – the SLC has often suffered from negative media 
coverage focusing on significant but rare cases of poor customer service or disputed 
practice. In addition, the SLC and shareholders have not always created opportunities 
to present the public with greater confidence in the products and services that the SLC 
provides.  
 
Furthermore, a number of those interviewed expressed the view that the SLC would 
benefit from a rebrand, in particular to highlight the fact that the payments they make 
to individuals are not traditional loans but exhibit characteristics more akin to a tax 
(income contingent repayment obligations). 
 
For England, Wales and Northern Ireland, a customer’s initial contact with the SLC is 
normally through its ‘domicile brands’: Student Finance England (SFE), Student 
Finance Wales (SFW), or Student Finance Northern Ireland (SFNI).  
It is generally not until a customer is approaching repayment that the SLC (as a brand) 
becomes more prevalent in communications (despite being listed in 
footers/agreements/content within their loan application). Customers have noted 
confusion at the SLC’s perceived use of multiple brands. 
The Augar Review4 has also made comment on this:  
It is widely recognised that the current terminology used to describe student 
finance (loans, debt, interest, liability etc.) can be unhelpful and misleading. For 
                                            
 
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/post-18-review-of-education-and-funding-independent-
panel-report p. 175-176 
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conventional debt such as bank loans, mortgages and consumer credit, total 
balance and interest rates are central to a correct understanding of what will 
ultimately need to be repaid. The student finance system by contrast behaves 
quite differently for most borrowers, for whom it operates in effect as an 
additional tax on earnings for the length of the repayment period. This leads to 
a gulf between perception and reality, to a misalignment of concern about how 
much is owed and how much will in fact be repaid. Indeed, the consumer 
champion Martin Lewis, and the Treasury Select Committee in its 2018 report 
on student finance, have advocated scrapping the term ‘loan’ altogether5. 
We have also heard students point out that the name ‘Student Loans Company’ 
does not aid understanding because some borrowers perceive it as a 
commercial enterprise that profits from the interest rates charged on student 
loans6.   
A recommendation on addressing this issue (aligned to the Augar Review’s 
recommendation to introduce new finance terms under the banner of a “student 
contributions system”) is outlined in section 4.4. 
High level recommendations related to the issues raised in this section have been 
summarised in the table below. Full analysis and rationale for these 
recommendations are outlined in section 4. 
                                            
 
5 House of Commons Treasury Committee (2018) Student Loans: Seventh Report of Session 2017-
19, p29-32. 
6 This view was also expressed by the SLC’s non-executive chair in discussion with the Education 
Committee  https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/education-committee/newsparliament-2017/accountability-hearings-student-loans-evidence-17-
19/ 
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Summary of recommendations relating to form and function 
23. The SLC should remain a GovCo NDPB for at least the next 5 years. The next 
Tailored Review should explore whether it would be appropriate to change the 
SLC’s status to an NDPB established by legislation. 
31. The Student Finance Policy team should conduct a review across products 
(and specialist grants in particular) to identify where means testing and eligibility 
protocols can be rationalised and streamlined. 
36 HMRC should carry out a comprehensive feasibility study (within 3 years) to 
explore the viability of HMRC taking on the repayment accounts in their entirety. 
37. Shareholders should not enact functional splits at this stage, given the fragility 
of the SLC’s IT infrastructure. 
38. Consideration on a name change for the SLC should be taken forward as part 
of the government’s conclusion to the Post 18 review. 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of form and function recommendations 
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2.2 Governance 
Good corporate governance is central to the effective operation of all public bodies. 
All arm’s length bodies (ALBs) require clear and compliant governance arrangements 
to drive performance, strategic direction and provide effective accountability and 
oversight. The Cabinet Office provides a range of guidance documents on good 
governance for public bodies7. 
The SLC’s broad governance arrangements are set out in the company’s Framework 
Document8, which has been recently refreshed. The SLC has also appointed a new 
CEO and CFO (in 2018); has widened the remit of its Audit and Risk and 
Remuneration, People and Organisational Design Committees; has appointed 2 new 
NEDs; and is in the process of recruiting a new chair, as the current Chair is planning 
to stand down in 2020.  
Ministerial responsibility and the shareholding structure 
DfE holds the primary relationship with the SLC as the main sponsor department in all 
matters of corporate governance. The Secretary of State for DfE is the Responsible 
Minister for the SLC, however, in practice, the Minister with responsibility for Higher 
Education acts on behalf of the Secretary of State and accounts for the SLC’s business 
in UK Parliament.  The DfE’s Permanent Secretary is the SLC’s Principal Accounting 
Officer and designates this responsibility to the SLC’s CEO, who is accountable to 
Parliament for the governance of the SLC. 
The current shareholding structure – as outlined in section 2.1 - has been in place 
since 2013. DfE and the DAs set the strategic direction for the SLC in the APRA, hold 
it to account for its activities and directly commission it to develop and deliver services 
for its national student financing policies. 
The majority of interviewees noted that historically, there has been a ‘top down’ 
relationship with shareholding departments – particularly DfE – where requests for 
new products or changes in processes have come in late and stacked in complexity, 
without always having early engagement with the SLC on feasibility or operational 
impact. 
Furthermore, there has often been a lack of alignment and prioritisation of shareholder 
requests to the SLC, leaving the company in the position of having to broker between 
departments to finalise policy commissions. Given the sensitivities of sharing early 
policy initiatives between different political parties in DAs, it may be the case that this 
will never be fully resolved in a devolved political system. 
                                            
 
7 Cabinet Office Guidance: Public Bodies, Information for Departments 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-bodies-information-for-departments 
8 https://www.slc.co.uk/media/10196/slc-framework-document.pdf 
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However, interviewees have noted that over the past year there have been 
improvements in the engagement and prioritisation process between shareholders 
and the SLC, with more effort to align commissions, earlier engagement and attempts 
to limit requests to free up resource for system stabilisation work. The policy 
commissioning cycle is further explored in section 2.3. 
Other issues identified by interviewees and previous governance reviews include:  
- the dominance of DfE shareholding and funding creating an asymmetric 
relationship between the shareholders, even though this does not represent 
their relative reliance on SLC operations; and 
- the fact that the sponsorship and shareholding functions are undertaken by the 
same teams by all shareholders, which has led to questions about whether they 
can provide independent shareholder challenge. 
The Sponsorship team 
As the majority shareholder, DfE also operates the main sponsorship function for the 
SLC. It was widely reported by those interviewed that in past years there has been a 
‘disconnect’ between the SLC and this function, There was a broad consensus that 
some important issues were ‘lost in translation’ and that the sponsorship team had to 
spend a significant amount of time amending and translating SLC business documents 
and explaining the realities of what is (and isn’t) feasible. Whilst this is improving, the 
SLC Executive Leadership Team (ELT) reported having minimal face time with 
Directors General, Permanent Secretaries and Ministers and that the operational 
parameters of the business were not always fully understood, by Departments and 
Ministers. 
This effect may have been compounded by the fact that the SLC has multiple 
interfaces with DfE, making it difficult for its sponsorship team to have full visibility of 
all requirements and requests on the SLC. Resourcing pressures and turnover of DfE 
personnel often add to this difficulty, as well as a plethora of meetings with similar 
agendas and underdeveloped terms of reference. Consequently, the added value of 
a sponsorship function with deep institutional knowledge is not always being 
maximised. 
There has, however, been notable recent improvement in relations and co-
development of key business initiatives. DfE and the SLC have worked in partnership 
to secure approval of an increase in pay for frontline staff in the SLC and are doing 
the same for the development of the Transformation Programme business case. This 
joint working includes initiatives such as providing access to professional expertise 
within DfE e.g. commercial, project management, regular site visits and co-
development of key documents. 
The Executive Leadership team and the Accounting Officer 
DfE’s Permanent Secretary designates Accounting Officer responsibility to the SLC’s 
CEO, who is responsible for safeguarding public funds and ensuring value for money 
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in accordance with Managing Public Money9. The ELT is responsible for controlling 
and monitoring the SLC’s operational and financial management. The strategic 
direction of the SLC is set by the shareholders, meaning that the ELT does not retain 
the traditional controls of a company executive function, which often limits the SLC’s 
capacity to make strategic decisions that align organisational objectives with capacity. 
As well as having limited say on strategic direction, the SLC also has a number of 
controls on its operational activities e.g. in areas of remuneration, procurement and IT 
spend. Whilst these are in line with other NDPBs and central government departments, 
these constraints often impact the leadership’s ability to manage risks as it sees fit and 
therefore there would be merit in exploring whether any exceptions would aid business 
delivery. However, it is not clear that the SLC ELT has always fully understood or 
utilised either the freedoms it does have or the clearances it should be seeking. A 
recent example of this is the low pay / high staff turnover issue. This is seen by the 
ELT as one of the biggest risks to the business, and yet the development of the 
business case to raise payment thresholds faced delays related to refining the content 
such that it met key Treasury requirements. In addition, some approvals were not 
obtained for confidentiality clauses that deviated from standard Cabinet Office 
wording, an error for which (in part) the SLC’s 2016-17 accounts were qualified. 
Furthermore, the GovCo NDPB corporate structure adds a degree of complexity in 
relation to the CEO’s reporting lines and responsibility – with obligations to 
shareholders, the sponsorship team and the Board. 
The Board 
The SLC’s Board is appointed by the Secretary of State and is responsible for 
establishing and taking forward strategic aims, and providing appropriate support and 
constructive challenge to the ELT. The Board is responsible to the shareholders for 
the SLC’s performance. 
The Board consists of: a non-executive Chair; the CEO (who may not hold the position 
of Chair); the Deputy CEO; the CFO; 7 NEDs and the Company Secretary. Of the 8 
serving non-executive board members (including the Chair), 5 are male, and 3 are 
female. There are also 1 male and 2 female executive members. There are currently 
no board members from a BAME background or who have a declared disability. As 
part of efforts to recruit from a more diverse field, the DfE has been seeking to 
proactively target a wide range of candidates via networking events; reviewing the CVs 
of ‘near misses’ in other DfE Public Appointment campaigns; promoting roles via social 
media and specialist media outlets; and potentially utilising recruitment consultants 
where necessary.  
As noted in section 2.1, almost all of those interviewed felt that there was a tension 
between the fiduciary responsibilities of the company Directors and the operation of 
                                            
 
9 Managing Public Money https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/managing-public-money 
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the shareholders having numerous decision-making and veto powers, over and above 
that of typical shareholding arrangements for traditional companies. 
In addition, all parties felt that a cultural norm has developed over the years, where in 
practice, the Board feels a constraint on its ability to freely and effectively manage 
risks and performance as it sees fit, for example, pushing back on commissions from 
the shareholders, scrutinising unit costs or having enough oversight of the 
Transformation Programme. Whilst this is improving – e.g. recent changes to the 
Board’s structure, the update of the Framework document and the Board’s push back 
on a potential APRA letter delay – the Board still often acts as an advisory or 
assurance body rather than driving strategy or having a decisive say on significant 
areas of operation. There have also been questions about the role of shareholder 
‘assessors’ on the Board, in particular, whether they are acting as shadow directors 
and how to establish clarity about whether actions and decisions have been formally 
noted and/or ratified by them.  
Good practice recommends that internal board effectiveness reviews take place 
annually, and external reviews every three years. An internal board effectiveness 
review was undertaken in 2014, and in late 2018, Board Evaluation Limited (BEL) was 
appointed to provide a comprehensive assessment of the Board’s effectiveness. BEL 
identified 8 priorities, the most pressing being the tension over the GovCo NDPB 
status, role of the Board and succession planning. The Board has since revised its 
format, alongside a refresh of the Framework Document. Recommendations from this 
review will also be incorporated into future changes. 
Risk management 
The SLC uses a structure of risk identification, assessment and escalation to assess 
the various challenges that the Company encounters and operates a cautious risk 
appetite. Risks are assessed against the SLC’s corporate risk matrix and are 
submitted to the Board on a quarterly basis. A number of regular forums are in place 
within directorates which allow the escalation of risks to the Corporate Register or the 
re-scoring of an existing risk. A separate but complementary process is in place to 
manage and escalate risks within the programme environment. 
The SLC is currently in the process of implementing a ‘Three Lines of Defence’ 
model to create and embed a strengthened assurance environment and align SLC’s 
risk management capability with industry best practice. Parallel to this, the SLC has 
been working with the DfE Sponsorship Team to improve risk governance between 
the Company and the Department and formalise the escalation procedures between 
SLC and DfE. 
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Figure 5: Three lines of defence at SLC 
Source: SLC 
 
In addition, progress has been made as follows:  
• Transition from Audit Committee to Audit and Risk Commitee, 
providing Board level sponsorship of Risk Management activity 
from ‘top down’; 
 
• Increased profile of Risk Management activity at Board and ARC, 
including representation by Chief Financial Officer/Chief Risk 
Officer and delivery of new reporting suites specific to the Board 
and ARC;  
 
• A move by Corporate Risk to independently assess previous 
reporting practices and risk descriptions, e.g. removal of the 
organisation’s use of caveats and qualifying statements (which 
diminished the efficacy of the risk description) and a greater focus 
on independently validated mitigation; 
 
• Further embedding the role of Corporate Risk as a 2nd line 
assurance function.  This recognises the independence of the team 
and their capacity to raise and escalate risks that have not been 
identified directly by the business; and 
 
• Updating of the business continuity major incident plan 
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Whilst progress has been made on improving the risk management architecture, the 
SLC has had a tendency to focus on operational issues that it can directly address, 
and not on wider strategic risks such as reputational damage and mitigation of 
potential future events such as a change of government. DFE’s monthly Performance, 
Finance and Risk meetings have not always provided a high level of scrutiny and 
challenge, tending to be more procedural than tactical. In addition, the SLC’s method 
of reporting risks is not easily accessible and is not underpinned by a mature Risk 
Management Framework which clearly aligns to a risk appetite statement and key 
business objectives.     
 
The ELT and Board is increasingly conscious of these issues and has recently moved 
risk management responsibility from the Company Secretary to the Chief Financial 
Officer’s directorate.  Further developments to be delivered in year include reviews of: 
• Refreshed Risk Appetite including enhanced guidance for Risk 
Owners; 
 
• Assessment procedures, risk classification, tools and 
techniques (including technology requirements); 
 
• Training and communication requirements; and 
 
• Risk Management Policy in line with output of the above. 
 
Auditing arrangements 
The SLC has both a third party external auditor, alongside an internal audit function 
responsible for testing for error across the business10 (more information on fraud and 
error available in section 2.4). The external audit function was previously provided by 
KPMG, and will now be conducted by the National Audit Office (NAO), in line with best 
practice corporate governance in the public sector and following recommendations 
from the 2018 NAO report11 on SLC governance.  From 1 April 2019, the SLC’s internal 
audit function is being provided by the Government Internal Audit Agency (GIAA).  
                                            
 
10 Working with the NAO and DfE, SLC’s Internal Audit team is responsible for testing for error across 
the student finance assessment system. Each year for DfE student support, Internal Audit test 
approximately 1,100 payments back to original application, for regularity and compliance with Student 
Support Regulations.  DfE statisticians calculate error rates and confidence intervals using data from 
SLC and methodology agreed by the NAO. 
11 NAO: Investigation into oversight of the Student Loans Company’s governance, and management 
of its former chief executive https://www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-into-oversight-of-
the-student-loans-companys-governance-and-management-of-its-former-chief-
executive/  
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In FY 2017-18, SLC’s accounts were qualified by KPMG for a legacy ‘regularity’ issue 
from a previous year. SLC has since taken appropriate remedial actions to improve its 
governance processes, including the appointment of a permanent CFO in July 2018. 
The SLC is not regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) or Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA), which makes sense given the unique nature of their 
financial products. However, there this is value to some of the guidelines and risk 
frameworks that these organisations operate with, to which the SLC has had some 
but limited engagement to date.   
Governance documentation 
Best practice indicates that the Framework Document should be updated every 3 
years (although its recent refresh took place after 9 years). The Framework Document 
will also be updated as necessary following this review.  This will go some way to 
clarifying the SLC’s structures, objectives, interactions and hierarchies.  
UKGI assessed the SLC’s corporate governance in spring 2018, reviewing against 
public sector best practice and making a series of recommendations for improvement. 
The NAO has also conducted a number of reviews, notably on the handling of the 
dismissal of Steve Lamey (former CEO) and the management of the loan sale 
process12. 
In addition, the Tailored Review team has assessed the SLC against exemplar 
governance arrangements as outlined in Tailored Review guidance13 (Annex D) and 
against the principles and approach set out in the Code of Good Practice for 
Partnerships with arm’s length bodies14 (Annex E).  
In summary, whilst the SLC (and its governance partners) have made some 
improvements in performance (see section 2.3), engagement and risk assurance, 
there are still improvements that are required, particularly with embedding risk 
management, utilising delegated controls appropriately, clarifying roles and 
responsibilities and developing purpose/vision.   
                                            
 
 
12 https://www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-into-oversight-of-the-student-loans-
companys-governance-and-management-of-its-former-chief-executive/ 
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-sale-of-student-loans/  
13 Tailored Reviews: Guidance on Reviews of Public Bodies Annex C p.30. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/63
3573/Tailored_Review_Guidance_on_public_bodies_V1.2_July_2017.pdf 
14 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/partnerships-with-arms-length-bodies-
code-of-good-practice 
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High level recommendations related to the issues raised in this section have been 
summarised in the table below. Full analysis and rationale for these recommendations 
are outlined in section 4. 
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Summary of recommendations relating to governance  
10. The ELT should ensure that they continue to embed a clear focus on the 
strategic deliverables of the company in the years ahead, with the following areas 
integrated into their business objectives alongside clear deliverables:  
- Delivery of Transformation Programme milestones 
- System wide embedding of risk management, financial literacy and cyber 
security  
- Development and delivery of vision, including exploration of sector wide 
links 
11. The ELT and shareholders should explore whether it would be feasible and 
appropriate to implement: 
- Retention of a proportion of the savings realised from the successful 
delivery of Transformation Programme milestones (to be re-invested into 
agreed business improvement activity)  
- An exploration of whether further controls should be delegated to the SLC 
and/or how to embed better use and understanding of existing controls 
- Access for SLC management to the Senior Civil Service development offer 
12. The ELT and Board should initiate an exercise to determine appropriate 
measures from industry best practice guidance against which they can 
review/monitor the SLC’s performance 
13. The Chair should be set appropriate objectives (commensurate with their role 
as set out in the Framework Document and in relation to the ELT and other NEDs) 
14. Mandatory induction and refresher training should be established for Board 
members (and the ELT/Ministers) 
15. The Board should continue to push to improve scrutiny and focus on strategy, 
performance, risk and finance  
16. Shareholders (with sponsorship team co-ordination) should continue to ensure 
earlier alignment on policy requests 
17. Shareholders should agree to operate in a more typical GovCo NDPB 
arrangement; setting the objectives, priorities and budget within a specified 
deadline, and giving the ELT and Board more autonomy to deliver  
18. The DfE sponsorship team should continue to act as shareholders for the SLC. 
In addition, shareholders should not sit as formal NEDs on the Board 
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19. There should be a focus on continuing to improve and strengthen the 
functional capacity and relationship between the SLC, shareholders, sponsorship 
team, CO and HMT  
20. The Sponsorship team should streamline/amalgamate meetings, and ensure 
stakeholders are clear of the aims/purpose, with well-established Terms of 
Reference 
21. The Sponsorship team should ensure that there are clear structures in place to 
review the Framework Document periodically (at least every 3 years) 
22. The SLC should develop and implement a comprehensive Risk Management 
Framework 
Table 5: Summary of governance recommendations  
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2.3 Effectiveness 
Performance overview  
In FY 2018-19, the SLC processed 2 million applications, made over 7 million 
payments and handled over 6 million telephone calls. 99.7% of students who 
submitted their applications on time had their funds in place for the start of term and 
the SLC received just 2.48 complaints per 10,000 apply-to-pay customers and 0.84 
complaints per 10,000 repayment customers. These include both complaints about 
policy – largely outside of the SLC’s control – and about operations and service. This 
is particularly impressive when set against industry averages15.  
 
Since FY 2011-12, customer satisfaction rates for applicants have increased from 
78.9% to 83.1%, and Higher Education funding applications assessed within 20 days 
of submission have increased from 85.6% to 94.5%. 
 
For FY 2018-19, the SLC had 43 performance targets which are formally set out every 
year in the APRA letter sent from DfE to the SLC’s CEO., 34 of these measures 
reported green (above target), 4 green-amber (adequate), 2 amber-red (of concern) 
and 3 red (below target).  
 
 
           Figure 6: FY 2018-19 Performance against APRA targets                          
                                            
 
15 https://www.fca.org.uk/data/firm-level-complaints-data-sortable-table  
43 
 
Source: SLC 
 
This performance is particularly impressive given the significant change in scale, 
scope and context that the SLC has been operating in over the past 7 years. Figure 
7 illustrates the substantial change in customer base and loan book size since FY 
2011-12, which has been in addition to the considerable leadership churn of 5 CEOs, 
5 CFOs, 2 departments, 5 ministers, 5 Director Generals and 6 Directors, not to 
mention the challenges around the dismissal of the previous CEO and the difficulties 
of recruiting and retaining highly skilled and specialist staff within an increasingly 
competitive jobs market (alongside the restricted remuneration historically available 
at the SLC).  
 
Other key contextual factors include: 
• the growth in product range; 
• a tripling of tuition fees post the 2012 Browne reforms; 
• the related lifting of the student numbers control cap; 
• the continued divergence of policy across the devolved administrations; and 
• the switch from mortgage-style loans to income contingent repayment 
obligations (ICRO).  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Increase in SLC operations since 2011/12 
Source: SLC 
 
In addition to the performance targets set out in the APRA, the SLC has developed its 
own performance dashboard (figure 8) and set of business objectives (table 8). 
 
Despite the broad achievement of objectives and performance targets within a 
demanding context, the SLC has also had a challenging few years. The removal of 
Steve Lamey as CEO in 2017 and the subsequent investigations, reviews and churn 
in the ELT have required significant focus and energy from the SLC, sponsors and 
shareholders, impacting on wider objectives and the morale of staff in general. 
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Satisfaction rates for borrowers in repayment have remained low compared to the rest 
of the business at 73.5% (although this is above the target satisfaction rate for 
repayers, which is 72%).  The Company still receives over 6 million phone calls each 
year – despite its improvement of the digital customer experience - from a total 
customer base of 8.5 million. It has faced significant levels of staff attrition and a 
number of its core IT systems are under-supported and/or out of date. It has also 
received negative publicity in relation to eligibility verification practices and had to deal 
with a number of system processing errors.  
 
Staff survey results show an engagement rate of 5.7 out of 10 in 2018, with particularly 
low scores in reward and career path development.  
 
In addition, as indicated in the Corporate Performance Dashboard below, whilst the 
delivery of current, inflight products are broadly effective, timely and within target 
parameters, there are significant and growing issues related to efficient and effective 
call handling; maintaining a productive and engaged workforce; and budget 
management. Many of these issues are correlated with the significant efficiency 
challenges outlined in section 2.4.    
 
 
Figure 8: Corporate Performance Dashboard FY 2018-19 
Source: SLC 
Challenges to effectiveness 
The SLC itself has highlighted the areas of considerable challenge for its 
effectiveness. These include: 
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•  recruitment and retention issues caused primarily by uncompetitive 
remuneration;  
•  the back log of activity from complex policy/product demands and ongoing 
activity from sizeable change programmes; 
•  the inflexibility of the technology architecture and niche nature of the skill sets 
required to manage and modify it; 
•  commercial challenges in moving from a large number of fragmented input-
based resource supplier contracts to a smaller number of outcome-based 
performance managed service contracts and/or sourcing new contracts that 
can produce high impact and vfm given the constraints on the business; and 
•  the need to implement strategic change, policy change and regulatory change 
(such as GDPR) in parallel. 
 
Indeed, in its Corporate and Business Plan FY 2018-19 to FY 2020-2116, the SLC 
identified seven key challenges (figure 9) grouped around the issues of digital deficit, 
staffing inadequacies, system complexity and the impact of the rapidly growing loan 
book. The first two of these issues are investigated in section 2.4 on efficiency. The 
latter two, alongside issues of strategic leadership and performance measurement, 
are further explored below.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Strategic challenges for the SLC  
 
Source: SLC Corporate and Business Plan 
                                            
 
16 https://www.slc.co.uk/about-us/remit/business-plan.aspx  
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Objectives/KPIs 
 
There is broad consensus from all key stakeholders that the SLC has historically had 
too many KPIs (43 set by the shareholders in FY 2018-19 and another 40 measured 
by the SLC’s corporate performance dashboard - which was originally developed with 
a view to being the only set measured - in addition to 5 key business objectives) and 
that they were not necessarily measuring the things that would really drive strategic 
improvement, effectiveness and efficiency. For example, there were no KPIs on unit 
cost per application or staff engagement.  
 
In addition, there is a sense of disconnect between the high performance on KPIs and 
the acknowledgment that the SLC is facing significant delivery challenges and 
strategic risks. It is also not immediately apparent how the KPIs are tracked and driven 
throughout the business, whether they provide appropriate stretch or whether they are 
linked to leadership performance and remuneration. The DAs have also noted that 
they would find a country breakdown more useful to help nuance and highlight any 
pertinent performance issues related to their customer base.  
 
In order to address these concerns, the shareholders have streamlined the 
performance targets set for the SLC in the FY 2019-20 APRA letter to 16 targets. This 
is a welcome reform and should go some way to help streamline strategic focus. 
Further recommendations on restructuring the performance targets are outlined in 
section 4.1.   
 
Development and delivery of strategic vision 
 
In addition to a more focused set of performance targets, many interviewees 
expressed the view that the SLC could be more proactive and robust in articulating 
both its sense of an optimal long-term vision for the future and its operational 
parameters and red lines. 
 
The SLC has done this in part by recognising that its operating model is facing chronic 
efficiency issues and devising a Transformation Programme to address this. The 
programme aims to introduce clear ownership of end-to-end customer processes and 
improve data management, technology, business architecture and staffing issues.   
 
With the appointment of a new CEO in September 2018, the SLC’s ELT and Board 
have spent time devising new a vision statement, mission and strategic objectives. 
Section 4.1 outlines additional recommendations to support this process. 
 
The policy commissioning cycle 
 
The policy commissioning cycle has been identified as one of the most significant 
challenges to the effective management of business processes, product development 
and budget forecasting for the SLC. The scale and growing complexity of products, 
shareholder divergence, extremely tight delivery timelines (with a fixed start date every 
academic year), limited early engagement and an efficiency deficit are all key factors 
feeding into the ever growing backlog of product development, alongside increasing 
pressures on SLC resources.   
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Historically, the student finance policy landscape has been relatively stable. However, 
in recent years there has been a significant increase in policy development together 
with divergence across the DAs. The product range now includes HE full time 
undergraduate loans and grants, HE part time undergraduate loans and grants, FE 
loans and most recently postgraduate doctoral and masters loans:  There are now 25 
products and more than 80 product variations (as outlined in section 2.1). Chart 1 
illustrates the growth in new commissions and roll over or ‘in flight’ activity year on 
year, which risks becoming unsustainable over time.   
 
 
Chart 1: Increase in change portfolio since FY 2012-13  
Source: SLC 
 
Annex F outlines the key issues and challenges with the current commissioning cycle. 
Whilst the establishment of DfE’s Policy, Planning and Engagement Group (PPEG) 
has sought to act as the single governance board for SLC policy requests from 
England, there still remains a lack of alignment on commissioning between the 
shareholders and even from other parts of central government (although the 
management of this has improved during FY 2018-19). This, coupled with:  
- insufficient development timelines;  
- a lack of mutual understanding of each others’ contexts;  
- late engagement on policy initiatives;  
- inaccurate resource estimates;  
- late change requests from shareholders;  
- processing errors;  
- complex and outdated IT infrastructure; 
- uncertain commercial arrangements; and  
- an increasing reliance on lower quality ‘minimum viable products’  
has resulted in SLC’s service launches being more numerous, later in the cycle and 
of poorer quality/functionality than would be desired. It has also meant that less 
capacity is available to work on strategic and tactical improvements to the operating 
system, creating a vicious cycle of ever greater inefficiency and reduced effectiveness. 
Staff 
days  
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This is especially important given the work underway to deliver the Transformation 
Programme (more information below). If the policy commissioning cycle is not 
reformed, it may be the case that the efficiency gains of new technological capacity 
become gradually eroded with an ever complex product landscape and unrealistic 
development windows. 
The sponsorship team in DfE has started work, in partnership with DAs and the SLC, 
to develop strategies and new protocols to address these issues. 
 
Repayments and loan sale support   
 
Since FY 2011-12, the size of the loan book (value of all the outstanding loan debt 
owed to government) has increased from £46 billion to over £136.7bn, significantly 
increasing the volume of repayment traffic that the SLC and HMRC manage. Table 6 
also highlights the substantial increase in the average loan balance and annual 
voluntary repayment of borrowers. 
 
 
Table 6. Average increase in loan balance and repayments 
Source: SLC 
  
The SLC and DfE have a working relationship with HMRC, which currently collects 
approximately 85% of loan repayments via PAYE and Self-Assessment; a service for 
which it receives an annual payment from DfE. The SLC directly collects the remainder 
of loan repayments for those outside of the UK tax system. Table 7 shows how rapidly 
the volume of overseas collection activity has grown in the past few years alone, in 
part as a direct result of the growth in the size of loans as per Table 6.  
l 
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Table 7. Growth in overseas repayments 
Source: SLC 
 
Millions of pounds worth of repayment collections are lost or ‘leaked’ every year due 
to SLC system inefficiencies, legal loopholes, error or fraud. In addition, the interface 
with HMRC - as well as a complex product base and outdated communications 
mediums e.g. annual paper based balance statements - often results in lower level 
customer satisfaction rates compared to the rest of the customer journey. Repayments 
is also the one area of the business that has experienced an increase in call volumes 
instead of a reduction. Whilst many of the calls and complaints are driven by customers 
unhappy with policy decisions outside of SLC’s control (or by the SLC making extra 
efforts to collect repayments), there is also an indication that the system and 
processing itself is not as streamlined and user friendly as it could be.  
In order to address some of these issues, the SLC and HMRC have commenced the 
‘More Frequent Data Sharing’ (MFDS) project. From April 2019, HMRC has been 
sending repayment data to the SLC on a weekly rather than annual basis. This will 
allow the SLC to calculate and manage customer accounts on a much more up-to-
date basis, and supports the SLC’s move to online balance information and its efforts 
to reduce the scale of over-repayment by customers nearing the end of their 
repayment term. The SLC has also instigated additional work to increase collections 
from customers overseas.  
It is important to note that the quality of data (which impacts on collection yield) is not 
solely the responsibility of the repayments function, but largely reliant on the accuracy 
and profiling of information collected during applications and assessments, as well as 
returns from HEIs and FEPs. Receiving accurate information about borrowers, 
including the timing of their participation in study, is crucial to being able to trigger the 
correct repayments at the right time. It is the case that education providers 
occasionally provide inaccurate or late data returns, and currently there is no 
disincentive or penalty for this.   
In addition to the maintenance and optimisation of general collections, the SLC also 
has the role of supporting loan book sales managed in partnership with UKGI and DfE. 
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The first securitised student loan sale was completed in December 2017 and the 
second in December 2018.  The SLC have received positive reviews regarding the 
handling of their data production and asset rationalisation in support of the loan sales 
and investor payment processing. A number of external audits have been conducted 
on these processes and to date, none have flagged any significant concerns. 
That being said, the current operating model does have a number of issues it needs 
to address, namely improving data integrity, modernising IT architecture, continuing to 
streamline the loan sale process across the cycle and ensuring adequate skill and 
staffing levels.   
In addition, the pressure and complexity of this function will increase significantly as 
the programme of sales continues, an issue that is further explored in section 3.3.  
Alongside operational optimisation challenges, UKGI has highlighted some 
governance issues in regards to the loan sales programme. It stated that HMT 
stakeholders believe that the current arrangements do not provide them - or UKGI for 
that matter - with sufficient visibility and engagement (particularly with the Board) on 
some aspects of the business, namely data quality management, error mitigation and 
loan book administration. This is a sentiment that was echoed in interviews for this 
review.  
The SLC has recently developed loan sale optimisation strategies centred around 
process standardisation and automation, improving performance metrics and 
increasing the capacity of data warehouses. However, given the scale and ambition 
of the loan scale programme, additional options may have to be explored to ensure 
long term effectiveness in this space and this is further explored in section 3.3 and 4.3. 
In summary, whilst the SLC is performing relatively well and delivering the majority of 
its KPIs, there are a number of issues impacting the successful achievement of its key 
business objectives. 
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Table 8: Performance against Key Business Objectives  
Source: Tailored Review analysis17 
 
Transformation Programme 
Programme overview  
The SLC developed a 2020 strategy in 2016 with the aim of modernising the company 
such that by the middle of the next decade it: 
- has significantly lower real terms operating costs;  
- is digitally secure;  
- is able to implement student finance policy more quickly; and  
                                            
 
17 SLC Corporate and Business Plan FY2018-19 to FY2020-21 
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- provides its customers with a user experience comparable to the best available 
in the financial services industry.   
Figure 10 outlines the high level deliverables of the early strategy as segmented into 
4 main themes: digital, technology, operational and repayments.  
 
Figure 10: SLC 2020 Strategy strands 
 
Source: SLC 17/18 Annual Report 
 
Strategic refresh 
 
Following the arrival of the new CEO in September 2018, a review of the 2020 Strategy 
was undertaken and concluded that: 
- SLC’s technology is not fit for a sustainable future;  
- multi-year investment (4 year proposition) is essential to make strategic 
transformation; and 
- better ways of working are needed between DfE and the DAs and between 
them and the SLC on the commissioning of new policy. 
 
To this end, and in support of a new business case to secure multi-year funding (which 
is still subject to review and to decisions taken at the Spending Review), the SLC has 
re-packaged the transformation strands to focus on: 
• Improving the policy commissioning process 
• Digitising the customer and user journey 
• Re-imagining the underlying business architecture 
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• Developing a target operating model for optimising data 
• Embedding an effective People Strategy 
• Accelerating service improvements using Lean techniques   
 
A key to the success of the Programme will be to ensure that the SLC has the space 
and resource to deliver this transformational change. Previous operational reviews 
noted that the SLC already has the comparable size and complexity of a small retail 
bank and that its ‘change’ costs had risen 10 times faster than BAU costs since FY 
2014-15. In the absence of policy simplification and/ or rationalisation, the requirement 
to meet non-negotiable delivery timescales for an increasingly complex portfolio of 
products will continue to drive up costs, error and risk, and drive down effectiveness 
across the board. This, in turn, will constrain and delay the ability of the Transformation 
Programme to affect positive change.  
 
In addition, holding the SLC to account and providing high quality scrutiny and support 
for the Programme will need to be a key focus of the Sponsorship team, with a much 
enhanced programme management function than that currently undertaken by the 
Whitehall Strategy Programme board which has overseen earlier iterations of 
transformation activity.  
 
It will also be worth exploring whether the SLC can be further incentivised by, for 
example, being able to keep a small proportion of any benefits realised over and above 
projected savings (to re-invest back into agreed business activities) or having 
enhanced/repackaged delegations were appropriate and useful.   
High level recommendations related to the issues raised in this section have been 
summarised in the table below. Full analysis and rationale for these recommendations 
are outlined in section 4. 
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Summary of recommendations on improving effectiveness  
1. Future – SLC leadership should spend the time to clearly develop and 
confidently articulate their vision and strategy for the company 
2. Engage - As part of a revamped policy commissioning cycle, it is essential that 
the SLC ELT communicate - in a clear and consistent manner - to the 
shareholders, sponsorship team and Ministers what their operating/change 
capacity is - and crucially, the risk impact of any new commissions 
3. Deliver – Robust programme management governance should be established to 
oversee the implementation of the Transformation Programme 
4. Performance targets should reformed and rationalised  
5. The policy commissioning process should be reformed 
6. As part of the objectives refresh, the SLC should ensure that they have 
adequate Board and leadership support to help embed their new target of 
optimising collections and loan sale support servicing 
7. The Board should request an annual ‘deep dive’ or formal reporting meeting 
outlining progress on the loan sale programme and any key risks or challenges for 
the SLC 
8. As part of the refreshed Transformation Programme, SLC should develop 
options for:                                                                                                                 
• building a stronger analytical and data management/cleansing skills base  
• investing in robotics/smart diagnostics and advanced analytics  
9. OfS and the SLC should explore how to strengthen enforcement of the F3 
condition of registration which stipulates that HEIs must provide the SLC the 
information that it requires to perform its statutory duties 
35. The SLC and UKGI should focus on optimising in house resource, data and IT 
capacity within the existing loan sales model. If required, future options on 
outsourcing should be investigated via a full feasibility study 
Table 9: Summary of effectiveness recommendations 
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2.4 Efficiency
With an ever-changing landscape and numerous policy demands, the SLC needs to 
ensure that it optimises its working practices and systems as far as possible. This 
includes understanding its financial projections whilst delivering value for money on 
behalf of the government, as well as setting out clear strategies to manage risk; 
counter fraud and error; upgrade IT and data management systems; and effectively 
enhance its workforce and estates strategies. The company’s top risks are generally 
centred on recruitment and retention, policy change overload, data integrity/security, 
technological risk and the wider political context. 
Financial spend 
Charts 2 and 3 depict the significant increase in both the customer base and 
concurrent cost base of the SLC year on year from FY 2009-10. While Chart 4 
demonstrates that the SLC has largely been able to manage down its unit cost per 
application, this is starting to increase; a trend related to the impact of staffing 
shortages and cumulative system inefficiencies and pressures. 
 
 
Chart 2: Increase in applicants and payment base since FY 2009-10 (does not include 
repayment customers) 
 
Source: SLC 
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Chart 3: Increase in SLC costs from FY 2011-12 
 
Source: SLC 
 
 
Chart 4: Unit cost per application from FY 2013-14 
Source: SLC 
 
Digital delivery and operational improvements resulted in steadily reducing application 
unit costs from FY 2013-14 to FY 2017-18 for both Student Finance England and 
Student Finance Wales18. This trend has not continued into FY 2018-19 because 
recruitment and retention issues (as outlined below) have resulted in lower staffing 
                                            
 
18 Cost for SFNi and Scotland are not readily comparable because a different service is provided.  
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within processing areas and increases in overtime and incentives to meet service 
levels. Indeed the operational costs of providing the “business as usual” services are 
forecast to rise from £135m in FY 2017-18 to £180m by FY 2020-21 (before projected 
transformation benefits of approximately £12m). 
 
Under the direction of the new CFO, the SLC has focused on strengthening forecasting 
skills, control and compliance arrangements. The SLC has carried out a thorough 
review of the classification of expenditure (i.e. Admin, Programme and Capital) to 
ensure that it complies with HMT guidance. This resulted in reclassifications of 
expenditure in FY 2018-19, which will impact on the SLC’s overall results for the 
financial year.  As outlined in figure 6, admin and capital variance targets were red for 
FY 2018-19, mainly as a result of reclassifying some activities between Admin and 
Programme.  
 
Moving forward, to ensure that all budget holders have a strong understanding of HMT 
guidance on how to classify types of expenditure, as well as Cabinet Office spending 
controls, the SLC launched a new mandatory training programme for all budget 
holders in early May 2019.  A new team in the CFO Directorate is to be established 
that will have specific responsibility for further developing a robust compliance 
framework and culture across SLC. 
Commercial relationships 
The SLC currently has 12 live contracts with a value of £5 million or more, with the 
biggest areas of spend on contact centre services, IT services and building leases. 
Whilst the SLC’s spend on individual contractors has steadily reduced over the years 
(£7.8m in FY 2013-14 to £2.2m FY 2017-18), its spend on ‘managed services’ – 
predominantly IT– has increased exponentially (£6.6m in FY 2013-14 to £37m in FY 
2017-18 and £47.8m in FY 2018-19).  This has been fuelled by a number of factors 
including an expansion of the student base, significant increases in product 
commissions, complex legacy IT systems and severe recruitment and retention 
challenges. 
The SLC’s strategy and approach to outsourcing is beginning to mature, moving away 
from tactical/ad-hoc spend on individual contractors to an aspiration to have a few key 
strategic partners on multi-year outcome-based performance contracts with shared 
risk/accountability and a more blended approach in terms of supplier payment 
mechanisms e.g. payment by performance, time & materials (where appropriate). This 
transition has historically been hindered by a lack of long term funding and an inability 
to commit to longer term contracts; reliance on time-constrained statements of work 
(typically quarterly) that reduce economies of scale and vfm; under-developed 
commercial acumen (in terms of articulating outcome based deliverables and 
managing the supply chain to achieve the same); platform/system interdependencies 
and integration; and limited engagement/leverage across government via the Crown 
Commercial Service and Government Digital Service (engagement with the latter has 
improved significantly over 2018-19 as described in the technology section).  
The CCS has established a number of positive features including recently recruiting 
regional account managers to help drive cross-sector collaboration, looking at ways to 
maximise commercial benefits from frameworks and developing a spend reporting 
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tool. However, the CCS would welcome a deeper relationship with the SLC to embed 
best practice and compliance e.g. with the Functional Standard for Government 
General Grants19. 
Fraud 
The SLC adheres to the Counter Fraud Functional Standards and was last reviewed 
against these by the Cabinet Office in April 2018. SLC scored 84% in this review and 
was found to be meeting 7 of the 11 standards. Of the 4 it did not meet, one required 
the SLC to provide an un-redacted version of a document, which has since been 
provided. The other 3 outstanding functions and the mitigating actions are: 
 
FS03 - The Fraud Risk Assessment:  The absence of post mitigation scores and a 
narrative on residual risk made this an amber.  Mitigation: Additional detail has been 
added to the SLC’s counter fraud team local risk register to show the post mitigation 
score and information on residual risks, if any, remaining after corrective action has 
been taken.   
 
FS04 - Policy & Response Plan:  Fraud was not clearly defined and no standards of 
expected behaviour within the document.  Mitigation: A Fraud Policy was finalised in 
April 2019. This contains clearly defined responsibilities for all staff within SLC when 
fraud is suspected or identified.  
 
FS06: Have outcome based metrics summarising what outcomes they are 
seeking to achieve that year. No Metrics Provided.  Mitigation: Metrics were 
developed to show the segmentation of customer groups. This allows the SLC to 
understand the volume of customers in each group, sample check each category in a 
structured way and understand the risk associated with each. 
 
The SLC was reviewed again in April 2019 and achieved 11 out of the 12 Functional 
Standards, with the missed score relating to the Fraud Savings audit which had not 
been completed in time for evidence to be submitted, but is currently underway. 
Error 
The SLC’s Internal Audit team, working with the NAO and DfE, is responsible for 
testing for error across the student finance assessment system. For FY 2017-18, true 
error was calculated at between £17-180m, this was a significant improvement from 
FY 2016-17 at £36-317m. This represents a broadly reducing trend since the FY 2011-
12, within a context of significantly increasing payments. For FY 2017-18 results, 95% 
of the error value arose from 5 key issues and the internal audit team has made 
recommendations to address each of these, which are currently being implemented.  
                                            
 
19 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/grants-standards  
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Technology 
Service delivery 
 
The SLC has a customer base that has grown up with access to digital information 
and has increasingly high expectations for digital service offerings. Reconciling the 
expectations of its customers with the complexity of its product offering is a significant 
challenge for the SLC. 
 
The Company has made some progress in this regard, for example in AY 2018/19, 
93.5% of applications were made online. The introduction of e-signatures in 2018 
made the application process fully online for most customers for the first time. The 
SLC also enabled online password reset in 2018 and work is underway to introduce 
digital evidence upload for a range of products.  Of particular note is the introduction 
of full customer service via social media (Facebook and Twitter) in December 2017 – 
one of the first government entities in the UK to do so. 
 
Although digital delivery improvements have been made, paper applications remain 
the only option for some of the more specialist product offerings and the SLC 
acknowledges that, on the whole, its service does not always meet the expectations 
of its digitally-enabled customer base. 
 
Customer calls 
 
The SLC has seen a consistent reduction in the propensity to call (customer calls per 
application) and overall call volumes (Chart 5) across all product types for apply-to-
pay customers in recent years. SFE reduced from 3.3 calls per application in FY 2013-
14 to 1.9 for FY 2018-19. This is particularly notable given the significant increase in 
the customer base and range of products over the years. In tandem, overall contact 
experience relating to call centres has increased from 83.6% in FY 2013-14 to 89.8% 
in FY 2018-19 for SFE. SFW saw a smaller increase from 89.6% to 90.7%.  
 
These volumes and experience rates are not uniformly mirrored across the user 
journey, with increased call volumes and decreasing contact experience relating to 
repayments. Overall experience relating to repayment customers contacting call 
centres has decreased from 87.3% in FY 2013-14 to 79.8% in FY 2018-19  (however 
the propensity to call has remained more less stable at 0.2 and customers have grown 
as per Chart 6).There are a mix of reasons cited for lower customers satisfaction, 
some of which are outside SLC’s control. These include repayment terms (interest 
rates, over-repayment), how funding is assessed when studying, level of debt, a poor 
online offering, lack of current balance availability and limited contact channels for 
repayers.  
 
Despite this general progress with apply-to-pay calls, the SLC still handles a large 
number of avoidable, high duration, complex calls that often require evidence from the 
customer, and in turn further manual processing. This additional call volume is 
exacerbated by a seasonal demand profile over the peak period where the SLC 
contract two outsourced contact centre service providers. Despite best efforts, given 
the short term nature of the work and the very steep ramp in resourcing (both up and 
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down), it is often the case that these third party providers deliver lower levels of service 
than SLC’s own permanent and experienced staff. 
 
 
Table 10: Top 10 call reasons FY 2018-19 
Source: SLC 
 
  
Chart 5: SFE Apply to Pay Call volumes since FY 2013-14 
 
Top ten call reasons FY18-19  Apply to Pay 
Evidence query 13.4% 
Application query – status of application 12.0% 
Application query – help with completing application form 6.3% 
Unable to login  5.5% 
Application query – change of circumstances 5.5% 
Application query – eligibility/entitlement query 4.5% 
Application query – payment not received   4.3% 
Application query –  child care query 4.2% 
Application query –  award query 3.0% 
Application query – Disabled Student Allowance query 1.9% 
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Chart 6: Repayment Call volumes since FY 2013-14 
Source: SLC 
Stability of SLC’s technology 
The SLC’s current technology architecture was created in the 1990s for a much 
simpler, lower volume service. The need to upgrade the SLC’s ageing systems and 
adopt new technologies is now critical. As new products have been introduced, 
scalability challenges and limited re-use of business rules have led to a fragmented 
digital offering and an inflexible ICT estate which significantly lengthens delivery 
timescales, pushes up customer calls, and increases the cost and risk of operational 
failure. These issues are coupled with the cyber security risks of a Company of this 
scale and historically poor data integrity, resulting in a technological architecture that 
is in critical need of reform.     
 
Over the past 4 years, the SLC has been working to update its systems to achieve 
industry standard levels of customer service and operations, most recently through the 
SLC 2020 strategy outlined in section 2.3. Whilst these have created more short term 
stability in the system, they have not always been comprehensive, in part due to the 
demands of the policy commissioning cycle and misalignment with IT partners. While 
some progress has been made, many of the remaining business services still carry 
some operational risk and until recently, there has been no clear IT roadmap, with 
tactical investment only partially reducing the risks of data loss and service downtime 
posed by increasing cyber challenges and overall complexity.  
In order to address these issues, the SLC has started a robust security programme 
which focuses on pro-active and re-active security measures, investing in the 
recognised key areas of identify, protect, prevent and recover. This is against a 
backdrop of market wide increasing cyber threats from attackers. The SLC is also 
commissioning a new Security Operations Centre to continue to evolve maturity of the 
practice and provide a major incident centre, for all business continuity. In addition, as 
outlined in section 2.3, a significant proportion of the Transformation Programme is 
dedicated to modernising and streamlining the IT estate.  
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It should also be noted that the relationship between the SLC and Government Digital 
Service (GDS) has substantially improved over the last 12 months, and there has been 
a renewed focus from the GDS and DFE on spending more time with the SLC through, 
for example, monthly visits. Since early 2018, the SLC has worked collaboratively with 
the GDS to move towards using the government digital platform (gov.uk) and to set up 
quarterly engagement forums in support of implementing the new Cabinet Office 
pipeline approval process. The forums are also being used to ensure that the SLC 
receives appropriate clearance and challenge from the GDS at the right stage of 
project development/service delivery.  
Workforce and shared services  
Pay and conditions 
At the start of 2019, the SLC had a significant number of staff earning less than those 
working for the Civil Service in all UK nations, and less than those in similar roles in 
banks. It was facing unsustainable rates of attrition, struggling to recruit staff both in 
front line customer facing roles and more technical specialist positions. Information on 
the gender pay gap20 (GPG) shows that the SLC had a median GPG of 2.5% (and 
mean of 10.87%) in 2018, both of which have increased since 2017. The SLC are 
undertaking a number of measures to address this, including developing a new pay 
and grading approach, improving support and advice, investing in women leadership 
programmes and seeking best practice from across government. 
 
The SLC monitors external market data and participated in the Civil Service Salary 
Survey. These showed that the SLC is on average c.31% below the private sector and 
c.18-34% below the public sector.  
 
The number of leavers per annum in the SLC’s Operations Directorate has risen from 
190 to 378 over the last five years at Grades 1 to 3, which is an increase from 14% to 
23% of headcount. Without any increase in pay rates, this was forecast to rise to 500 
by 2020, an increase to 32%. This would be the same across the Glasgow and 
Darlington sites, with the Welsh site having even higher rates; currently 34% and 
expected to increase to 52% by 2020 before any pay upgrades. Most of those leavers 
are at the bottom two grades within the SLC pay bands.  
  
The levels of attrition are putting the SLC’s front line processing and contact centres 
at heightened risk of failure and the organisation is working with levels of occupancy 
in these roles that are unsustainable. To mitigate these risks, the company has 
increased the use of outsourced providers, who typically offer a lower quality service 
than the SLC’s own staff. The quality issues experienced from the outsourcer stem 
from tenure of their staff, training time and access issues to multiple systems. 
Additionally, incentives to work overtime have had to be offered to staff to encourage 
them to fill the capacity gap, which in turn has driven up unit costs per application. 
 
                                            
 
20 https://www.slc.co.uk/about-us/equality-diversity-and-inclusion.aspx   
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The Welsh government implemented the Living Wage Foundation (LWF) rate for 
Wales-based SLC staff from 1 April 2017, which created a disparity between SLC 
colleagues performing the same roles in different locations. This was a response to a 
more competitive labour market position faced in Wales and also to the Welsh 
government’s policy that all public sector staff should be paid at the LWF rate. Although 
improved, attrition rates remain high at the Welsh SLC site, pointing to the fact that 
improving recruitment and retention is not solely related to pay rates.  
  
The SLC submitted a business case to HMT seeking approval to increase the base 
pay for the lowest paid staff in the SLC, removing the disparity with Wales-based staff. 
This was approved in March 2019 with pay uplifts due to be implemented by October 
2019. A second pay case (which will be integrated with the Transformation 
Programme) addresses more systemic structural pay and grading issues across the 
whole organisation. Both cases are aligned to the future shape of the organisation and 
the savings that will be achieved through its delivery. 
 
A holistic people and wellbeing strategy with clear development and progression 
routes for staff who feel valued is also of critical importance. The SLC’s recent 
Employee Engagement Survey showed that whilst there have been improvements in 
management support, peer relations and mentoring, most measures are below 
industry benchmarks, with significant lag in rewards, career path development and 
freedom of opinions.  
 
The Transformation Programme will develop and implement a strategic workforce plan 
which outlines the size, shape, skills and location of the SLC workforce in the future 
state. The Programme will set a new cultural tone based on the ‘SLC Way’ and embed 
defined SLC behaviours across the business. This will need to include career 
progression pathways for the frontline staff that will increasingly focus on complex 
cases as digitisation and automation remove manual and mainstream processing.  
 
Property 
The SLC has 5 offices across Glasgow, Darlington and Llandudno Junction as well as 
access to an office in London, which is shared with the Office for Students. At each 
site, the sq.m per FTE is below the Cabinet Office-defined workplace standard 
maximum of 8 sq.m per FTE. The average across all SLC sites is 5.17 sq.m per FTE. 
This efficient use of space is particularly concentrated at Lingfield Point in Darlington 
and Bothwell Street in Glasgow where the SLC operates a back-shift (a shift outside 
of regular 9am-5pm office hours). There are no staff permanently based at the London 
office. This is used by SLC’s Board and staff for London-based meetings including 
Main Board meetings and stakeholder forums. 
 
The SLC Estates team has recently carried out a benchmarking exercise on the 
London Office, based on current utilisation and it was identified that better value for 
money could be achieved. The SLC is liaising with the Office for Students (who occupy 
the building) to explore options for optimising arrangements.  
The SLC is also working with the Government Property Unit (GPU) to ascertain 
whether or not the Glasgow Hub Phase 2 is a viable option for them (this forms part 
of the UK Hubs programme, the aim of which is to deliver modern, flexible shared 
spaces in regions across the UK to allow government departments to be located 
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together and realise value for the tax payer). However, given the pending 
Transformation Programme with its inherent changes to the future size, shape and 
potential operating locations for the SLC, the company is not currently in a position to 
be able to commit to a long term location lease for the time being. 
 
The SLC’s other locations provide good value for money and the location in Darlington 
in particular – where the SLC is one of the largest employers – supports economic 
growth and the regeneration of the North East. The SLC currently experiences 
significant recruitment and retention challenges at all three sites (Glasgow, Darlington 
and Llandudno Junction). The buoyancy of local job markets is a factor, however, the 
primary drivers of these challenges are SLC’s own constraints on pay, progression 
and conditions (as discussed at above). 
 
Shared services 
The provision of internal audit services for the SLC transferred to the Government 
Internal Audit Agency on 1 April 2019. Apart from this, the SLC does not currently 
utilise a shared services model for any back office support. Staff conditions, 
contractual terms and HR policies and procedures are not aligned to those of the civil 
service, which might present challenges in utilising a shared services model for HR 
functions. The SLC and DfE are, however, exploring the feasibility of transferring the 
SLC Pension Scheme to the Civil Service Pension Arrangements (CSPA), with a staff 
consultation to be launched in Summer 2019. Despite some potential complexities to 
adopting shared services with other organisations, these may well offer economies of 
scale, vfm and greater expertise than delivering functions solely for the SLC. This has 
not previously been explored fully and with recent moves on pensions and auditing, 
as well as the wider commercial approach, it may be beneficial to assess the scope 
for further shared service functions.     
 
The SLC is currently introducing a new enterprise resource planning (ERP) tool, 
Workday, which will provide an integrated HR, payroll, commercial and finance 
system. It will allow for simpler, digitised and consistent ways of working and deliver 
and integrated picture for all people and finance related information. This is a 
significant people, process and technology change for the Company.  It will be 
delivered in two phases with Phase 1 targeted for Q4 2019 and Phase 2 to be 
completed in Q2 2020. 
Transformation plans 
In summary, there are specific areas that need investment if the SLC is to achieve 
industry standard levels of customer service and efficiency of operations. These 
include higher quality digital customer service; upgraded IT systems; reductions in risk 
and error; strengthened management capabilities; a more effective policy 
commissioning process; and a more competitive employee value proposition  to 
achieve stable recruitment and retention rates. The SLC Transformation Programme 
has been developed specifically to address these. 
 
Specifically, the Transformation Programme’s focus on upgrading the IT and data 
architecture should make it much easier for the SLC to respond quickly and safely to 
new commissions. These improvements will also drive down the cost per customer for 
many if not most services and will enhance the digital journey for applicants. Whilst 
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subject to business case approval, securing multi-year funding of the Transformation 
Programme will help to accelerate what has historically been a slow process of change 
hindered by new products implemented on legacy systems and making further 
improvements even more challenging.   
 
High level recommendations related to the issues raised in this section have been 
summarised in the table below. Full analysis and rationale for these 
recommendations are outlined in section 4. 
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Summary of recommendations on optimising efficiency   
24. SLC and the sponsorship team should work together to develop a robust 
business case to HMT to approve multi-year funding for the SLC Transformation 
Programme 
25. The SLC should consider how it can enhance and embed peer support for its 
tech and digital transformation plans  
26. The SLC should determine appropriate best practice measures from industry 
guidance on IT resilience 
27. The SLC should continue its good progress on work to improve the customer 
digital experience in partnership with GDS  
28. Building on the people strand of the Transformation Programme, the SLC 
should develop a holistic People Strategy, including considering the use of 
performance contingent retention mechanisms/incentives for staff  
29. The SLC should continue to roll out and embed out training for key personnel 
on financial and commercial acumen, especially on understanding government 
finance and accurate profiling 
30. The SLC should continue to work with the Government Property Agency to 
assess whether a Glasgow based government hub is a viable option for relocation 
of its Glasgow sites and assess other sites for vfm and potential 
consolidation/savings 
32. The SLC should focus on securing a few strategic IT partners on a multi-year 
footing based on payment by results with shared accountability and mixed teams 
33. The SLC should commit to investigating options for shared services 
contracting for back office functions 
34. CCS and the SLC should consider options for greater cross government 
collaboration and commercial leverage, including highlighting performance data 
and feedback on framework commissioned services 
Table 11: Summary of efficiency recommendations  
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Chapter 3: What factors are likely to impact on the 
SLC’s future functioning? 
3.1 Post-18 Review 
Background  
In February 2018, the Prime Minister launched a major review of post-18 education. 
The wide-ranging review will be informed by independent advice from an expert panel 
from across post-18 education, business and academia chaired by Dr Philip Augar, a 
leading author and former non-executive director of the Department for Education. The 
Augar Review’s recently published report21 has focused on the following four areas: 
• Choice: identifying ways to help people make more effective choices between 
the different options available after 18, so they can make more informed 
decisions about their futures.  
• Value for money: looking at how students and graduates contribute to the cost 
of their studies, to ensure funding arrangements across post-18 education in 
the future are transparent and do not stop people from accessing higher 
education or training. 
• Access: enabling people from all backgrounds to progress and succeed in 
post-18 education, while also examining how disadvantaged students receive 
additional financial support from the government, universities and colleges. 
• Skills provision: future-proofing the economy by ensuring that the post-18 
education system is providing the skills that employers need; boosting the UK 
economy and delivering on the government’s Industrial Strategy. 
It is now for the government to consider the panel’s recommendations, before 
concluding the overall review.  
Implications for the SLC 
Many of the panel’s recommendations, if adopted, would have significant 
consequences for the SLC’s operations and its strategic direction. In turn, the SLC is 
a critical delivery partner for potential Post-18 Review (P18R) reforms and, as 
discussed in chapter 2, it is essential to strengthen its operational resilience to put it 
on a stable footing to be able to implement any potential changes.The SLC has carried 
out a very high level, initial delivery assessment of the Augar Review’s 
recommendations (which will need to be reviewed in due course when more details 
are available, including the government's formal response). In broad terms, the SLC 
has indicated that it can deliver the panel’s key student finance changes in a phased 
                                            
 
21 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/post-18-review-of-education-and-
funding-independent-panel-report 
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programme of work with the first of the major deliverables in place for AY 2021/22.  
However, the government has yet to conclude the review. Delivery of any potential 
reforms is dependent on government confirming the final policy with the SLC early in 
quarter 1 of 2020 and directly engaging with them in the detailed formulation of policy 
prior to this to enable preparation, planning and the opportunity to design for optimal 
end to end delivery. Sufficient time will also have to be provided to the Devolved 
Administrations to consider their response/cross border impacts and to be able to 
commission the SLC accordingly.  
As ever, the SLC’s ability to deliver is constrained by the shareholders’ overall delivery 
ask, which will need to be carefully balanced if delivery of policy change is to be 
successful.
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3.2 Technological Developments 
The SLC is heavily reliant on digital and technological processes to deliver its services. 
Over the next decade, the pace of large scale technological change will provide the 
SLC with new opportunities to develop, alongside the associated challenges and risks. 
Technology driven change is likely to accelerate in the future and the SLC will need to 
adapt to both a shifting landscape and higher expectations from its relatively young 
user demographic. Technological capacity will therefore become increasingly 
essential, especially when combined with developments in cyber threats, machine 
learning, big data, digital profiling and systems alignment.  
Better use of technology will reduce the SLC’s costs and could also potentially deliver 
a near seamless customer experience. This section provides a brief overview of how 
the SLC has planned for large scale technological developments, as well as a RAG 
rating of their urgency. 
The SLC’s current technology position 
As outlined in section 2.4, there has been historic underdevelopment of the SLC’s core 
IT infrastructure. The Company has frequently needed to prioritise the delivery of each 
year’s new policy priorities ahead of upgrading core systems, which in turn has led to 
the evolution of functions with multiple independencies that complicate the process of 
developing new products and services. This is further constrained by the SLC’s scale, 
which is comparable to that of a medium sized bank with an IT system that has over 
400 interaction points with other systems.  
 
As the SLC’s customer base continues to grow, the systems it currently uses will 
continue to become overstretched. They will have to be updated to ensure that they 
meet the expectations of new users, with modern modularised ‘building blocks’, a fully 
digitised forward facing platform and accessible, well maintained data. A complete 
transformation of the IT system will be needed in the next 4 years in order for the SLC 
to continue to achieve its core functions.  
Preparedness for the future  
IT infrastructure 
Urgency: Critical  
The SLC has developed an ambitious Transformation Programme to, in part, address 
its technological challenges and upgrade outdated legacy systems in ledger, lending, 
repayment and collections. The Technology component of the strategy specifically 
seeks to adapt and modernise the structure of the SLC’s key IT platforms, with 
programme goals including disaggregating and layering major system elements to 
create an environment where new product deployment can be contained within 
discrete modules, thus enabling faster, lower risk and more cost effective change 
capability for stakeholders and lower costs per application. As reiterated throughout 
this Review, updating the IT infrastructure will be a critical enabler for SLC business 
and delivery of any potential Post 18 Review reforms.  
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Cyber security 
Urgency: Urgent  
Cyber-attacks are growing more frequent across the private and public sector, and are 
sophisticated and damaging when they succeed. This threat to the SLC cannot be 
eliminated completely, but the risk can be greatly reduced.  The SLC is a particularly 
attractive target given the volume of data that it holds, and vulnerable given the number 
of endpoints and age of IT systems. As part of the Transformation Programme the 
company is working to develop and mature its cyber defence capability. A vital part of 
this - alongside technical preparedness - will be training staff (particularly seasonal 
contractors) to be hyper aware of security risks. The SLC will need to continue to 
connect with cross government resources and advances in the market, e.g. the 
National Cyber Security Council (NCSC) run simulations to test reactions to a cyber-
security breach. The SLC will also need to continue to work closely with DfE to ensure 
compliance with any future Authority to Operate stipulations, which will outline 
acceptable risk levels and residual risk management expectations.  
 
GDPR 
Urgency: Important 
The SLC is currently in the process of reviewing and updating its data protection 
practices to meet the enhanced requirements of the GDPR. It is in contact with the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) to ensure compliance, has appointed a 
designated Data Protection Officer (DPO), and reports regular progress at the Board 
and ARC. The SLC adopted a multi-phase risk based delivery of GDPR change 
activity. Phase 1 successfully achieved a basic level of compliance with the new 
regulations by the enforcement date of the 25 May 2018. Key areas of work still to be 
completed in Phase 2 include targeted bulk data erasure, secure data transfer, 
enhancements to the Information Asset Register, individual rights provisions, supplier 
governance framework and delivering an ongoing framework of communications, 
training and enablement for the culture change required.  
 
Data sharing:  
Urgency: Important 
The SLC is undertaking a number of improved data sharing initiatives, most notably 
More Frequent Data Sharing. Other examples include testing whether HMRC’s foreign 
address data can help locate customers oversees and data sharing on benefits 
claimants to support fraud prevention. Whilst there are broader technical issues that 
need to be resolved – namely, establishing government wide agreements on data 
sharing protocols and systems interfaces – there remains significant potential for 
increased data sharing between government bodies to help feed into intelligent policy 
design and risk assessment. 
Analytics, big data and AI:  
Urgency: Important 
The SLC is making attempts to use data more intelligently by having a better 
understanding of the data they currently hold (and how to use it), as well improving 
data sharing (see above). They are also exploring introducing robotics and further 
automation as part of the loan sale optimisation programme. That being said, the 
SLC’s modelling and analytics function is fairly underdeveloped and the necessity for 
this skill set will only increase given the repayments trajectory as outlined in section 
3.3. Whilst systems stabilisation must take priority, there are potentially significant 
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gains in using smart diagnostics processes to understand trends in customer 
behaviour, flagging risky borrowers and modelling future pay and repay scenarios. The 
necessity to maximise loan book yield will increasingly drive this requirement for more 
intelligent use of customer data. 
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3.3 Repayments and Sales 
Future growth 
As outlined in section 2.3, since 2011-12, the size of the loan book (value of all the 
outstanding loan debt owed to government) has increased from £46 billion to over 
£136.7bn. This significant growth is set to continue in the years to come, with the policy 
and demographic changes - as outlined in sections 3.1 and 3.5 - likely to mean an 
uplift in student numbers and those eligible for finance support packages. 
Charts 7 and 8 below show that the total value of repayments made each year is 
projected to increase by c.48% in FY 2022-23, and that over the same period, the 
number of customers in repayment is expected to grow by c.47%. 
 
Chart 7: Projected growth of the repayments to FY 2022-23 
Source: SLC 
 
Chart 8: Projected growth of the repayments customers to FY 2022-23 
Source: SLC 
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Loan book servicing  
In addition to the growth in collections, the SLC also has a significant role in supporting 
the programme of loan book sales, and the subsequent servicing of the loans sold to 
investors. The first securitised student loan sale was completed in December 2017 
and introduced a new asset class to the market, raising £1.7bn of proceeds. The 
second loan sale was completed a year later in December 2018, raising £1.9bn of 
proceeds. It is the government’s policy to continue with a programme of sales targeting 
£15bn by 2022-23. In support of this process, the SLC has to provide well packaged 
and detailed tranches of data to aid the sales transaction team in UKGI and conduct 
a comprehensive asset rationalisation process to verify the annual distribution(s) of 
funds to investors.    
In order to achieve the production of multiple Servicing Reports within the agreed 
timeframe, the SLC must achieve a significant uplift in optimisation across the current 
loan sale processes, technology and resource model. Whilst the SLC can manage this 
process currently, the administrative burden of doing this for more loan sale asset 
investors is likely to require extra resource and process improvements. 
In addition, new EU securitisation regulations - which came in to force on 1st January 
2019 - will increase reporting requirements to 4 times a year for new sale assets (there 
is no impact on the loans sold in December 2017 and December 2018).  
Accurate and well maintained delivery of its serving responsibilities is even more 
critical given that the government carries contingent liabilities in the event of a master 
servicer failure from the SLC (or HMRC).  
In addition to these resourcing challenges, the SLC have identified issues in processes 
and technology, and have highlighted some improvements that are required to 
manage the system if the full programme of sales are executed as planned. 
As described in section 2.3, the SLC is undertaking a loan sale optimisation 
programme to address these challenges, supported by a Lean streamlining approach. 
It has set up a Loan Sale & Asset Management function, implemented a new strategic 
data warehouse to support the sale programme and increased staff working on the 
servicing process including a new Data Quality team. 
Strategic focus and analytics  
Alongside the operational burdens of a growing loan book and increasingly complex 
servicing requirements, many of the SLC’s leadership team recognise that there are 
underutilised strategic opportunities in the current repayments strategy. As well as a 
historic prioritisation on ‘money out’ versus ‘money in’, the SLC is hamstrung by IT 
systems which do not adequately facilitate the use of smart diagnostics for effective 
modelling, proactive use of data analytics and more precise customer segmentation 
in order to minimise repayment leakage and maximise yield. Indeed, unverified 
customers account for c. £7bn of uncollected repayments (although many of these 
would not be in a position to repay). Optimised collections strategies are being 
developed as part of the Transformation Programme, including a renewed strategy for 
overseas collections and the launching of the MFDS programme with HMRC.  
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In summary, the rapidly increasing size of the loan book and the government’s policy 
position to continue and speed up loan book sales underscores the increasing 
importance and value of having a robust, well-resourced and effective repayment 
strategy which actively seeks to maximise yield. 
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3.4 Constitutional Issues 
Implications of leaving the European Union (EU) on the SLC 
Historically, the UK has the second-largest group of international students in the world 
after the US. International students bring an economic benefit to the UK and are an 
important export market, with the government estimating their export value at £20 
billion in 201622. Higher Education and Statistics Agency (HESA) data indicates that 
27% of first year international students in higher education in AY 2016/17 were from 
EU countries23.  
 
The impact of the UK leaving the EU poses new changes and challenges for student 
support and funding for both EU citizens studying in the UK, and UK students in the 
EU. Currently, the draft Withdrawal Agreement does not explicitly confirm whether 
there will be any changes to student funding during the transition period including for 
those students beginning courses in AY 2019/20. However, given the relatively low 
number of EU students in the UK and vice versa (c.152,000) and the fact that 
repayments are typically collected directly (rather than via reciprocal tax arrangements 
with EU administrations), it is felt that the operational impact on the SLC will be 
manageable. There may however be indirect challenges if the numbers of students 
(and therefore collections) drop significantly, as staffing and budgetary profiles are 
modelled on anticipated numbers of applications.  
 
The SLC is working collaboratively with DfE and a Student Finance EU Exit 
Implementation Board has been established to formalise the governance around exit 
preparations, as well as a number of EU Exit planning workshops. External 
communications plans will be put in place, if required, for both a ‘deal’ and ‘no deal’ 
scenario. At the appropriate point, the SLC will be required to communicate changes 
in entitlement and residency criteria to future students, whilst collecting bespoke 
repayments from EU students and UK students residing in the EU. 
The EU Settlement Scheme will be a key consideration for the SLC’s preparedness. 
Once the scheme is fully operational, it will allow the SLC to use this database to check 
the settled status of all applicants, which will greatly support the application process 
going forward. 
 
                                            
 
22 International education strategy, p.4 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-education-strategy-global-
potential-global-growth  
Impact of International Students in the UK, p.3 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/739089/Impact_intl_students_report_published_v1.1.pdf 
23 https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/students/where-from  
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Devolution 
As outlined in section 2.1, the SLC has 4 shareholders, split between DfE (85%) and 
the other three DAs (each with 5%). Education and student funding policy is 
devolved, and therefore each DA is entitled to devise their own policies and 
processes with regards to how the SLC administers support to students studying in 
their countries. This divergence has increased in recent years (and may continue to 
in light of any potential Post-18 reforms) and is one of the drivers of complexity and 
cost in SLC’s administration. Consideration on a further split of functions between 
the shareholders is outlined in section 4.4.    
Wales 
Alongside the SLC’s Transformation Programme’s vision to address the efficiency 
and effectiveness challenges, the Welsh government is also currently investigating 
alternative options for organising future provision, in line with the recommendations 
in the Diamond review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance 
Arrangements in Wales report (2016)24. They have commissioned a feasibility study 
to assess what functions could be administered by the Welsh government directly, if 
required.  
The high level objectives of the review are to: 
• understand the customer experience associated with the current delivery of 
Student Finance Wales (SFW) for grant and loan applicants and wider 
stakeholder considerations; and  
• obtain a clear understanding of how the systems interact. 
 
The review is likely to be completed by Summer 2019.  
Northern Ireland 
The Northern Ireland (NI) Assembly is currently dissolved, and when Ministers return 
they may well decide to introduce changes to the current student financing 
arrangements.  
As part of the negotiations involved in the UK exiting the EU, the UK government will 
need to consider whether students from the Republic of Ireland continue to qualify 
for home fee status and student loan funding. The government is also considering 
whether a bespoke NI agreement will need to be drafted. 
The NI administration is conducting a review on its policy in respect of Disabled 
Students’ Allowances, as well as reviewing funding for postgraduate study.  
                                            
 
24 https://gov.wales/review-higher-education-funding-and-student-finance-
arrangements-final-report 
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Scotland 
In Scotland, the independent Review of Student Support25, suggested that the 
Scottish government undertake further work or consider in more detail a number of 
recommendations. As such, the Scottish government is considering areas such as 
whether loans should be introduced to FE; the interactions between the social 
security system and financial support for students; and further consideration of 
discretionary support and for part-time students. The Scottish government has 
extended the guarantee of home fee status for EU students to those starting in AY 
2019/20 and 20/21. 
Divergence  
Outlining this activity is a high level demonstration of the likelihood of increasing 
divergence of policy and approach between the DAs and DfE and its resultant impact 
on the SLC. Whilst early interaction and alignment on policy commissioning has 
improved between shareholders, this fragile coalition is always at risk with changes 
in ministerial direction or differences in political parties between the DAs. The option 
of a further split in administrative functions between the DAs is outlined in section 
4.4.
                                            
 
25 https://www.gov.scot/publications/independent-review-student-financial-support-
scotland/  
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3.5 Customer Trajectories 
Changes in customer base 
The Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI) published a report in March 201826 which 
looked at the demand for higher education in England until 2030. It reviewed the 
current environment, demographic challenges, strength of the supply chain and 
emerging political disrupters against the previous HEPI assessment on demand which 
was published 7 years prior, in 2011. The most significant policy changes between 
these two studies were the introduction of students paying fees above £9,000 and the 
removal of controls on student recruitment.  
As per chart 9, the 2018 report concluded that, at the current rate of growth, without 
any increase on current participation, there will be nearly 15,000 more entrants by 
2030. With a 26% rise in the rate of participation of young people under 20 (based on 
the historic trend of 0.75% annual increase in participation rates), the forecasted 
addition in entrant rate by 2030 would be nearer 105,000. 
The 14,709 additional entrants arising from demography alone (with a static 
participation rate) will amount to around 50,000 additional students and the 
105,000 additional entrants, if participation continues to increase at the 
medium-term rate, will require about 350,000 additional places.27 
 
 
Chart 9: Growth in 18-year old population to 2034 
 Source: HEPI 
                                            
 
26 Demand of Higher Education to 2030 By Bahram Bekhradnia and Diana Beech, March 2018 
27 ibid, p.32  
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Table 12: Growth in full time undergraduates to 2034 
 Source: HEPI 
The report went on to conclude that the increase in demand would be far higher if the 
groups which are, at present, under-represented in Higher Education - namely young 
people from disadvantaged backgrounds and males - were to increase their 
participation significantly. Indeed ‘in 2019 the application rate was higher than ever at 
38.8 per cent, and it has been growing strongly and predictably over the past decade. 
Extrapolating this trend forward would give application rates of just under 50 per cent 
in 2030, making English 18 year-olds 25 per cent more likely to apply than today’28 
With current government initiatives working to do just that, it is not unlikely that there 
will be a further upward trajectory on these numbers, although this will need to be 
countered with the, as yet unknown, impact of the UK exiting the EU. The report 
estimates that there could be a ‘decrease of 56,000 or so from EU students, though 
that will depend on the details of the Brexit negotiations’29.   
In addition to the growth in student numbers, it is also important to understand the 
changes in the circumstances of those repaying loans and how these might impact on 
their propensity to pay. The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices ‘Good 
Work’30, published in July 2017, looked at the changing landscape of employment. As 
well as greater participation from people aged 50+ and more part-time working, the 
Review also highlighted research showing that 12% of UK working-age adults who 
have not participated in ‘gig’ economy work (short term freelance activity) in the last 
                                            
 
28 https://wonkhe.com/blogs/the-great-recruitment-crisis-planning-for-rapid-student-
number-growth/  
29 Demand of Higher Education to 2030 By Bahram Bekhradnia and Diana Beech, March 2018, p.40  
30 Good Work – The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices By Matthew Taylor, July 2017 
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12 months were thinking about doing so over the next year. Research from the 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development also shows that a high proportion 
of gig economy workers (58%) are permanent employees elsewhere, engaging in gig 
economy activity to top up their more ‘traditional’ employment. This may be significant 
factor for the SLC and HMRC as it is likely to be more difficult to track individuals with 
a number of short term or multiple contracts with the systems and infrastructure 
currently in place. In addition, the increase of gig work income as a ‘top up’ could see 
people fall within the legal loophole which means that whilst they might earn more than 
the £25,000 threshold for initiation of loan repayments, they are not earning this from 
a single source and therefore the system does not recognise that they need to start 
repaying. The SLC have requested that this loophole is legally amended but this is yet 
to be actioned by DfE.   
 
 
Figure 11: Workforce trends 
Source: Tailored Review team analysis 
In aggregate, a larger customer base who will go on to form a more diverse labour 
market with increasingly complex working arrangements will inevitably add extra 
processing demands for SLC’s systems. 
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Chapter 4: What are the recommendations for 
improving the SLC? 
As the previous 2 chapters have made clear, whilst the SLC is performing relatively 
well and delivering the majority of its performance targets within challenging 
circumstances, it faces significant operational and strategic issues. Chief amongst 
these are the high level of risk and inefficiency from outdated legacy IT systems, a 
workforce experiencing high turnover and a complex and time pressured policy 
commissioning cycle with no multi-year budget settlement. In addition, instability and 
lack of clarity on governance and leadership has sometimes impacted the confidence 
of the organisation and its shareholders to clearly articulate its vision and deliver 
transformation strategies. 
Significant improvements have been made in recent years, including: 
• successfully introducing a number of new products;  
• appointing a new CEO and CFO;  
• improving alignment with and between shareholders;  
• securing a pay upgrade for lowest paid staff; 
• taking on a new loan sale support function; 
• introducing the More Frequent Data Sharing programme;   
• developing a new Transformation Programme; and  
• digitising a number of services and platforms.    
 
The recommendations outlined in this chapter are intended to complement and 
enhance the positive improvements that are already underway at the SLC. They are 
focused on ensuring that SLC’s staff, IT and governance are well managed and both 
robust and flexible enough to reduce operational risk and deliver any key policy 
changes likely to be implemented from the Post-18 Review. 
Given the scope of this Tailored Review, these recommendations are focused on 
changes that can be feasibly delivered in the next 3-5 years. There will be additional 
opportunities to deliver wider benefits over a longer time horizon, once the 
Transformation Programme has been delivered and the implications of EU Exit and 
the Post-18 Review fully established. To this end, recommendations for establishing 
potential future options are outlined in section 4.4.  
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4.1 Optimisation of leadership 
Strategic Vision 
It is essential that both the SLC and shareholders ensure that their management and 
leadership practices reflect the scale of the task to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency at the Company. 
Recommendation 1 
Future – SLC leadership should spend the time to clearly develop and confidently 
articulate their vision and strategy for the company. This could include, for 
examples, considerations for greater system wide integration e.g. with the OfS and 
UCAS to help provide a smooth customer experience and to optimise collections 
and data management. The agreed vision should be featured in corporate 
business plans and well integrated with the Transformation Programme. An 
example list of long term strategic objectives for the SLC is outlined in Annex G. 
 
Recommendation 2 
Engage - As part of a revamped policy commissioning cycle, it is essential that the 
SLC ELT communicate – in a clear and consistent manner - to the shareholders, 
sponsorship team and Ministers what their operating/change capacity is - and 
crucially, the risk impact of any new commissions - rather than giving general 
warnings or continuing to accept commissions that put operational delivery into a 
precarious position. The Board must have oversight of the commitments that the 
ELT have made. 
 
Recommendation 3 
Deliver – Robust programme management governance should be established to 
oversee the implementation of the Transformation Programme for both:  
a) Sponsorship oversight of delivery and milestones 
b) Internal SLC project management  
This will need buy-in from all key stakeholders and incorporate established project 
management protocols with a focus on scrutiny of milestones and benefit 
realisation. The sponsorship governance function should report into the Quarterly 
Shareholder Meetings. 
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Performance targets  
As outlined in section 2.3, all stakeholders agree that historically there have been too 
many key performance indicators and that these have not always measured the things 
that will really help to drive strategic improvement, effectiveness and efficiency. 
Recommendation 4 
The DfE sponsorship team, on behalf of all shareholders, and SLC should reform, 
rationalise and embed performance targets as follows: 
• Aligned - one primary set measured by shareholders, the Board and ELT 
i.e. one set in the APRA and corporate dashboard   
• Refined - no more than 5-10 headline targets (with lower level KPIs) centred 
around digitised customer service, value for money, reducing risk, fraud and 
error, delivering the Transformation Programme and optimising collections 
and loan sale support                                                                                                                                                                                    
• Reviewed - annual review of targets including reviewing against similar 
organisations and historic SLC performance. Where appropriate, stretch 
and incremental targets should be set to drive continuous improvement, 
with recognition that this will be an incremental, progressive change 
• Embedded - targets clearly reflected in the objectives of all staff (including 
the ELT, Chair, NEDs) and throughout business documents and processes. 
Performance should be incentivised e.g. bonuses for performance above 
target levels. Every governance meeting should be structured around 
reporting against or developing improvements in the performance targets, 
especially the Board meetings 
• Supported - if feasible, each performance target should have a sponsor ELT 
Director and NED 
Policy commissioning cycle 
It is essential that the policy commissioning process is transformed to support 
sustainable change and BAU capacity, giving enough space for the vital 
transformation activity as well as time to develop high quality products and reduce 
manual work arounds and annual carry over of ‘in flight’ projects. 
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Recommendation 5 
The sponsorship team and SLC should reform the policy commissioning process 
in accordance with the following principles:   
• Streamlined and strengthened governance arrangements, with a single 
formal, sign off point for policy/product commissions and regulatory 
alignment, in response to a single shareholder commission e.g. a shared 
Governance Gateway Board that would act as the official and final 
governance body for the commissioning process 
• More clarity of role, scope, timescales and governance arrangements of 
specific groups involved in the process, including an annual agenda and 
stage gates that clearly prescribe the annual window for commissions, 
whilst also incorporating an element of flexibility and a process for 
unavoidable changes to be made after the formal sign off point, recognising 
the political landscape across the shareholders and the impact of this on 
policy change. This new approach should be agreed by all parties, including 
Ministers, with everyone aware of their responsibilities and the procedural 
red lines 
• Better balance between the ‘responsibility’ of the SLC to clearly outline its 
annual change capacity and the impact of new commissions on resource, 
risk and cost, and its ‘right’ to have greater independence to deliver within 
set parameters once commissions have been agreed without having to 
seek extra permissions 
• Shared operating language and continual engagement throughout the 
policy commissioning cycle, included baked in time and resource for ‘soft’ 
feasibility testing and formal agreement on how SLC and shareholders will 
work together 
• Built in protections for strategic and transformation activity. Continued use 
of the prioritisation approach started in FY 2018-19 to manage requests, 
with non-negotiable ‘must dos’ and a longer list of desirables dependent on 
budgetary and resource capacity once necessary transformation activity is 
factored in 
• New approach enshrined in a memorandum of understanding included as 
an Annex to the Framework document, with relevant sign up from 
shareholder Ministers, UKGI, HMT, Cabinet Office and GDS as required 
 
 
 
85 
 
Repayments and the loan book 
As outlined in section 2.3 and 3.3, it is essential to optimise loan repayments given 
the scale and growth of the loan book and sales programme. The SLC has 
developed an approach to this as part of the Transformation Programme and 
additional recommendations to support this effort are outlined below. 
Recommendation 6 
As part of the objectives refresh, the SLC should ensure that they have adequate 
Board and leadership support to help embed their new target of increasing 
repayment compliance, administering the loan book effectively and efficiently, 
delivering post loan sale obligations and supporting future sales. 
 
Recommendation 7 
The Board should request an annual ‘deep dive’ or formal reporting meeting 
outlining progress on the loan sale programme and any key risks or challenges for 
the SLC. UKGI should conduct this in partnership with DfE and relevant SLC 
management. The Board should also ensure that it has regular updates from the 
ELT on ongoing developments and any servicing risks or opportunities for the 
company.    
 
Recommendation 8 
As part of the refreshed Transformation Programme, SLC and DfE should develop 
options for:                                                                                                                 
• building a stronger analytical and data management/cleansing skills base 
(e.g. development of an in-house team, sharing capabilities with DfE 
analysts) 
• investing in robotics/smart diagnostics and advanced analytics for great 
understanding of borrower characteristics, behaviours and risk factors 
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Recommendation 9 
OfS and the SLC should explore how to strengthen enforcement of the F3 
condition of registration which stipulates that HEIs must provide the SLC the 
information that it requires to perform its statutory duties in relation to students 
accessing student support, their registration with the provider, the fees charged, 
the students’ attendance and any withdrawal from a course. 
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4.2 Clarity of governance 
Alongside strong leadership with a clear voice and vision, it is important that all parts 
of the governance structure understand their role and have the right protocols in 
place to support each other to effectively govern the company. 
The Executive Leadership Team 
Recommendations are centred around helping to strengthen stability and leadership, 
with a particular focus on supporting delivery of the Transformation Programme.  
Recommendation 10 
The ELT should ensure that they continue to embed a clear focus on the strategic 
deliverables of the company in the years ahead, with the following areas integrated 
into their business objectives alongside clear milestones:  
• Delivery of Transformation Programme milestones 
• System wide embedding of risk management, financial literacy and 
cyber security  
• Development and delivery of vision, including exploration of sector wide 
links, e.g. with the OfS and UCAS 
 
Recommendation 11 
The Sponsorship team should explore whether it would be feasible and 
appropriate to implement: 
• Retention of a proportion of any savings realised above stated targets  
from the successful delivery of Transformation Programme milestones 
(to be re-invested into agreed business improvement activity)  
• An exploration of whether further controls should be delegated to the 
SLC and/or how to embed better use and understanding of existing 
controls e.g. financial/spending controls, clearance gates etc   
• Access for SLC management to the Senior Civil Service development 
offer, including project/programme/risk management, leadership and 
team building to strengthen team dynamics 
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Recommendation 12 
The ELT and Board should initiate an exercise to determine appropriate measures 
from industry best practice guidance against which they can review/monitor the 
SLC’s performance e.g. PRA risk framework, UK FRC Corporate Governance 
Code and FCA principles.      
The Board 
Recommendations are centred around strengthening the role and scope of the 
Board, and continuing to enhance scrutiny on risk, performance delivery and a value 
for money. 
Recommendation 13 
The Chair should be set appropriate objectives by the sponsorship team 
(commensurate with their role as set out in the Framework Document and in 
relation to the ELT and other NEDs), with guidance developed for the Board and 
shareholders on how (and by whom) annual performance reviews should be 
conducted and proper succession planning. 
 
Recommendation 14 
The sponsorship team should ensure that mandatory induction and refresher 
training is established for Board members (and the ELT/Ministers where possible 
and appropriate). This should be offered at set points (e.g. as part of induction/ 
every 3 years/aligned to significant changes) and cover topics such as the 
governance structure, appraisal arrangements, delegations and retained 
permissions, government finance and fiduciary responsibilities. 
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Recommendation 15 
The Board should continue to push to improve scrutiny and focus on strategy, 
performance, risk and finance by: 
• Agreeing and embedding a refreshed vision and mission with the ELT 
• Embedding systematic oversight over the Transformation Programme, 
policy commissions, strategic risk management and unit cost analysis 
• Commissioning external board effectiveness reviews  every 3 years 
• Ensuring that board papers and meetings are focused on the most 
important issues, risks and challenges with clear updates on 
mitigation/management & any decisions required, all linked to the key 
business objectives. Secretariat to be strengthened to support this 
The Shareholders 
Recommendations are centred around clarifying the role of shareholders, and 
promoting more alignment in their interactions with the SLC. 
Recommendation 16 
Shareholders (with sponsorship team co-ordination) should continue to ensure 
earlier alignment  on policy requests, with an objective of agreeing a single 
shareholder commission request, as outlined in the principles for a new policy 
commissioning approach. 
 
The meaning of “shadow director” is defined in s215 of the Companies Acts. It 
stipulates that ‘a person is not to be regarded as a shadow director by reason only 
that the directors act (c)in accordance with guidance or advice given by that person 
in that person's capacity as a Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the 
Ministers of the Crown Act 1975)’. Given that this is the case for shareholder 
attendees on the board, they cannot be legally considered as shadow directors. 
In addition, it is important for the board to act in the capacity of an external and 
expert assurance function and should therefore not be unduly influenced by 
shareholders sitting formally as NEDs. Indeed, if they were to become NEDs, this 
would likely unbalance the board as each shareholder would want their own 
individual NED ‘seat’ as opposed to one NED representing all 4 administrations. It is 
important that the board remains in a position to offer independent advice to 
ministers should it wish to, without the involvement of shareholders if necessary, 
especially given the shareholders’ potential spilt incentives. It is important, however, 
that the secretariat ensures that formal actions or decision for assessor shareholders 
are clearly logged to avoid any ambiguity of whether these have been registered. 
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Recommendation 17 
Shareholders should agree to operate in a more typical GovCo NDPB 
arrangement; setting the objectives, priorities and budget within a specified 
deadline, and giving the ELT and Board more autonomy to deliver (once their 
capability has been established via delivery of Transformation Programme 
milestones). This would entail a cultural shift from ‘parent-child’ to equal partners. 
 
Recommendation 18 
Given the fact that policy development sits with a separate team, the DfE 
sponsorship team should continue to act as shareholders for the SLC. In addition, 
shareholders should not sit as formal NEDs on the Board. However, the Board 
secretariat should tighten protocols around formally logging and commissioning 
actions raised at the Board, and clarify that the shareholders are not acting as 
shadow directors and any commensurate implications. 
The Sponsorship Team 
Recommendations are centred around encouraging the positive recent progress 
towards a more productive and streamlined working relationship with the SLC. 
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Recommendation 19 
There should be a continuation of the improvement and strengthening of the 
functional capacity and relationship between the SLC, shareholders, sponsorship 
team, CO, UKGI and HMT by:  
• Sponsorship team providing appropriate challenge to the SLC, 
particularly on risk management, with more focused Performance, 
Finance and Risk meetings based on rigorous scrutiny of updated risk 
framework  
• More use of e.g. secondments, ‘staff swaps’, site visits, shadowing, 
teach ins, showcase days, guidance tools, buddying, co-location for very 
intensive projects 
• Organising regular structured ministerial meetings with the CEO and 
Chair 
• SLC/sponsorship further developing expertise on business case 
development, MI production, public law requirements and CO/HMT 
processes 
 
Recommendation 20 
Sponsorship team to streamline/amalgamate meetings, and ensure stakeholders 
are clear of the aims/purpose, with well-established Terms of Reference. 
 
Recommendation 21 
Sponsorship team to ensure there are clear structures in place to review the 
Framework Document periodically (at least every 3 years), including holding 
stakeholders to account for meeting minimum annual requirements. 
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Risk Management 
Recommendation 22 
The SLC should develop and implement a comprehensive Risk Management 
Framework (RMF) which: 
• is proportionate to the activities and responsibilities of the SLC as set out in 
the Framework Document; 
• is aligned to the Risk Appetite Statement (which should articulate how much 
risk the SLC is willing to take in pursuit of its purpose and strategy);  
• reflects the key risks to the SLC meeting its strategic and business 
objectives, including reputational risk; 
• has clear ELT Risk Owners, and SMT responsibilities; 
• sets out the processes and responsibilities to identify, monitor, manage, 
mitigate, report and escalate risks; and 
• clarifies the role and the reporting requirements of the various governance 
bodies in the oversight of the SLC. 
It is also recommended that there is a dedicated Chief Risk Officer.  This person 
should have the appropriate leadership capability, experience, skill set and 
resources to develop and implement the RMF in a realistic timeframe. 
Structural Form 
In addition to the ‘three tests’ outlined in section 2.1, a further set of questions, as 
outlined in figure 12, were considered when assessing the potential form of the SLC.  
 
 
Figure 12: Assessment of structural options 
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Source: Tailored Review analysis 
 
Remaining as a GovCo NDPB is the only option that: 
a) avoids the cost and complexity of enacting a large scale governance change. 
This is especially important given the multitude of critical efficiency issues that 
need to be urgently addressed via the Transformation Programme; 
b) maintains stability while the implications of the Post-18 review and EU exit are 
better understood; and 
c) retains an independent Board whilst also maintaining a close link to 
departments for involvement in early policy development.  
 
It may also be possible to convert the SLC to another legal structure, while retaining 
its status as an NDPB. This would be either via Royal Charter - which are not routinely 
favoured as they bypass a number of parliamentary checks and balances - or through 
primary legislation - which would be difficult to secure given that the legislative 
timetable is very full with EU exit related business.   
 
Whilst it is clear that remaining an NDPB with GovCo legal status is the most practical 
option for the short to medium-term, there is a wider question about what the optimal 
structural arrangement is in the long term.  
 
Executive Agency (EA) 
 
EAs are clearly designated business units within departments, responsible for 
undertaking the executive functions of that department, as distinct from giving policy 
advice. They have a clear focus on delivering specified outputs within a framework of 
accountability to Ministers. While they are managerially separate, they are 
independently accountable within their home department, which also reports to 
Parliament on their agency-specific targets. Due to this close working relationship, EAs 
do not have the same level of legal separation from their home departments that other 
categories of public bodies often possess. They are run by a ministerially appointed 
Chief Executive and are often supported by an advisory board.    
During interviews, a number of stakeholders highlighted the potential benefits of 
changing the SLC from a GovCo NDPB to an EA in order to address issues such as 
staff pay, recruitment and retention and improving the working relationship with DfE. 
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High level EA SWOT analysis 
 
 
Figure 13: EA SWOT analysis 
 
Source: Tailored Review analysis 
 
Staff 
Under an EA model, the workforce would be brought fully into the Civil Service which 
would likely reduce some of the ongoing issues of low pay and high attrition rates. This 
in turn could potentially improve workforce engagement and culture due to Civil 
Service flexible working policy, access for all staff to wider learning and development 
and opportunities for promotion and progression across the whole of government.  
That being said, the impact of these changes is likely to be minimised for a number of 
reasons. The SLC and DfE are already working towards the inclusion of all staff into 
the Civil Service Pension Scheme, bringing greater stability to their workforce benefits. 
As explained in section 2.4, lower paid staff have already been granted a significant 
pay rise this year, with a second pay case being developed to address more systemic 
structural pay and grading issues across the whole organisation. The pay uplift is 
already having a positive impact on recruitment and retention figures. It is important to 
note, that whilst the SLC Board has delegated authority as a GovCo NDPB to control 
pay allocation (how much is allocated to each pay band), as with other NDPBs, it does 
not control how much money is allocated overall or whether it can breach civil service 
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wide pay rise caps. This would not change if the SLC became an Executive Agency. 
In addition, in moving to an EA model, there are various staffing issues that would 
need to be considered, such as TUPE negotiations, locations strategy, staffing 
structure and organisational fit. Work would need to be undertaken with staff to 
alleviate the associated concerns around role tenure, grading, career prospects, 
location changes and culture shift, which for some (potentially highly skilled and 
experienced staff) may well lead to further resignations. 
In conclusion, whilst there are undoubtedly some benefits to incorporation of staff 
within the departmental structure, it is unclear how much of a significant impact this 
would have on recruitment and retention figures, particularly in light of the changes 
that the SLC already has underway.   
Policy Commissioning Cycle 
Closer links with the largest shareholder may further improve the policy commissioning 
cycle, as well as increase access to DfE Ministers, and enable the SLC to be involved 
in policy development feasibility testing earlier,  
However, this is not necessarily guaranteed and a closer alignment with DfE may be 
to the detriment of the Devolved Administrations. Any change to the SLC delivery 
model would have to ensure that the DA interests are retained, which is difficult to 
envisage if they lose shareholdership, board representation and the SLC’s full 
immersion into DfE. 
The SLC is currently working with all of the shareholders on improving the policy 
commissioning cycle. DfE are hosting a number of workshops to set the scale and 
pace of change needed to develop a more cohesive model that works for all key 
stakeholders. As with the changes to the pay and people strategy, if these new 
approaches are well developed and embedded, it is likely that they will yield a similar 
level of benefit to a full structure change.   
Governance 
In an EA model, the Board would become an Advisory Board, would have less 
autonomy and would no longer be expected to make key strategic decisions for the 
SLC. The CEO would acquire more of this responsibility and would be likely to sit on 
the internal DfE leadership team.  
Given the significant transformational change required at the SLC, this loss of Board 
autonomy may reduce the effectiveness of their ability to really drive meaningful 
change and hold the organisation to account. There is also the risk of increased 
ministerial or political ‘interference’ of a nature that would not be helpful to keep the 
focus on effective delivery and appropriate efficiency drives.  
On balance, it does not appear that converting to an EA would make securing the 
strategic changes required at the SLC any more likely than it remaining as an NDPB 
and enacting its reform programme. In addition, it would absorb significant time and 
resource and may well undermine the ability of the SLC to maintain its operational 
independence and procedural expertise.  
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Full outsourcing/Joint Venture  
 
Another potential option is to contract out the student loan financing function fully, with 
government either retaining a shareholding stake (Joint Venture) or relinquishing 
shareholding function and simply setting the legislative environment within which a 
private organisation would have to administer student loans and grants. Given that the 
SLC does not own any ‘assets’ as such (HMT controls ‘ownership’ of the loan book), 
this model would not take the form of an AssetCo or Trading Fund (status being 
phased out), and instead would likely be established as a Statutory Corporation or 
Joint Venture.    
High level full outsourcing SWOT analysis  
Figure 14: Full outsourcing SWOT analysis 
Source: Tailored Review analysis 
 
At present this option is not viable for a number of reasons.  
• As outlined in section 2.3, one of the most challenging aspects is the policy 
commissioning cycle, and the propensity for minimal early engagement in policy 
development. This tendency would likely be exacerbated if the student 
financing function were fully outsourced as there would be security restrictions 
to sharing emerging policy developments with a private sector company. It 
would also likely make closer working relationships with mixed teams more 
difficult to establish.   
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• In addition, having a private sector organisation field change requests is likely 
to have a significant impact on costs for product development. Within a 
commercial contract, any change requests tend to incur a charge and given the 
complexity of service design and the product base, these may well be 
substantial.   
• Given the SLC’s fragile and complex IT infrastructure, large scale data 
migration would be extremely risky. The data records of more than 8.5 million 
customers are held on systems which are highly integrated and difficult to 
manipulate. Transferring those to an external company would not be advised 
at this point in the SLC’s transformation journey. Even private sector financial 
companies that have attempted large scale systems upgrades have suffered 
serious malfunctions, let alone moving data between organisations. 
• The Devolved Administrations have made clear that they are not in favour of 
fully outsourcing the function of student financing and their ministers would not 
sign off this transition. 
• Chapter 2.4 explains that the SLC is on a journey with regards to the maturity 
of its commercial operation, this is also the case for DfE’s commercial function. 
Whilst this is improving, there is still significant progress that needs to be made 
with regards to embedding robust contract management, particularly on a 
contract of this size and complexity. There are also reservations about whether 
there would be any suitable private sector organisations willing to take on this 
type of operation.     
 
Changing the legal status of a NDPB 
A third option would involve the SLC remaining an NDPB but changing its legal 
status away from a GovCo, to be established instead via primary legislation. This 
would allow the SLC to retain a degree of operational independence with a robust 
Board, but lose the Companies Act director responsibilities which are often the cause 
of tension and confusion. Although this would not be able to be enacted in the next 
3-5 years given the pressure on the legislative timetable and the wider programme of 
reforms, it is an option that may well offer a workable compromise on governance 
structure in the long term and its suitability and potential timetable for implementation 
should be thoroughly considered by the next Tailored Review. 
 
Recommendation 23 
The SLC should remain a GovCo NDPB for at least the next 5 years, as long as 
the SLC and its partners make the critical governance, cultural and systemic 
changes outlined throughout this chapter. The next Tailored Review should 
explore whether it would be appropriate to change the SLC’s status to an NDPB 
established by legislation, and if so, what the practicalities and timetable for 
implementation would look like. 
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4.3 Stabilisation of systems 
The third key area for SLC improvement is the stabilisation of its operational and 
functional systems. As outlined in section 2.4, improvements in efficiency, particularly 
with IT and staffing, are of critical importance for the ongoing viability of the Company, 
reducing risk and securing value for money. 
The central mechanism for this work will be via the Transformation Programme. The 
recommendations outlined below are intended to support and augment the 
deliverables of that strategy. 
Recommendation 24 
SLC and the sponsorship team should work together to develop a robust business 
case for HMT to approve multi-year funding for the SLC Transformation 
Programme. Enactment of the activity in the strategy will be critical for securing the 
sustainability of SLC systems and delivery of its business objectives. 
IT and Data 
Recommendation 25 
The SLC should consider how it can enhance and embed peer support for its tech 
and digital transformation plans (e.g. from other government departments and 
wider industry), including possibilities for data sharing to feed into intelligent policy 
design and risk assessment. This could include establishing an IT advisory board 
to capture sector expertise and best practice or being invited to pre-existing 
forums. 
 
Recommendation 26 
The SLC should determine appropriate best practice measures from industry 
guidance on IT resilience e.g. Cyber Essentials Plus, PRA principles on effective 
operational resilience and EBA guidance on IT/security risk management. This 
should build on the external assurance work already conducted and be linked to 
recommendation 12. Particular focus should be given to embedding secure 
practices throughout the business and allocating an appropriate level of cyber 
security investment and contingency funding. 
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Recommendation 27 
The SLC should continue its good progress on work to improve the customer 
digital experience in partnership with GDS – including building up digital network 
connections and learning from other major digital projects e.g. MoJ, DWP, DVLA. 
Staffing, training and property 
Recommendation 28 
Building on the people strand of the Transformation Programme, the SLC should 
develop a holistic People Strategy, outlining how it will develop its staff, attract and 
build required skill sets and reduce reliance on contractors. This could include 
initiatives such as benchmarking their benefits with comparable organisations; 
implementing a bonus scheme linked to individual objectives, establishing staff 
wellbeing practices, considering the use of performance contingent retention 
mechanisms/incentives for staff and improving organisational culture. This will be 
crucial given public sector restrictions on pay. 
 
Recommendation 29 
The SLC should continue to roll out and embed training for key personnel on 
financial and commercial acumen, especially on understanding government 
finance and accurate profiling. 
 
Recommendation 30 
The SLC should continue to work with the Government Property Agency to assess 
whether a Glasgow based government hub is a viable option for relocation of its 
Glasgow sites and assess other sites for vfm and potential consolidation/savings. 
Functional model  
As outlined in section 2.1 and highlighted in table 3, the SLC has a number of functions 
which are then split across different products. Given the range in cost and efficiency 
of administering the various process stages for each product, it is worth considering 
whether any of these are suitable for outsourcing or configuring in a different way.  
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Mainstream loans 
 
Administering student loans is a functional strength for the SLC and forms the bulk of 
volume of its operations. This part of the business also has the lowest unit cost 
compared to other types of products (£19 compared to £56 for the most expensive 
product type). A number of organisations - e.g. DWP, DVLA, Rural Payments Agency 
- currently field and assess applications and then pay out large scale, state funded 
financial or technical support products to the public and related institutions. Banks also 
provide similar, private payments to the public. As a comparator - and although more 
complex - the current unit cost for a DWP Universal Credit claim is £69931. DWP is 
aiming to reduce this to around £175 but this is still significantly more expensive than 
the current SLC unit cost for any of its products, including the more complex means 
tested ones.  
 
Given that the SLC has built up a functional capacity in this space and providing good 
value for money, it is not clear that any existing or new organisation should or could 
adopt the administration of this function and provide comparable levels of service, 
value for money and relatively low customer complaint rates. In addition, it is essential 
that control of this provision remains close to government given the scale and scope 
of new product development, eligibility changes and the level of early input required to 
support this. 
 
Repayment 
 
HMRC currently recuperate approximately 85% of monies owed to the government on 
behalf of the SLC. They have functional expertise with regards to repayments and may 
be able to deliver greater economies of scope if they took on full administration of all 
loan repayments, though the customer service benefits of this functional move may 
well be less significant given the introduction of the More Frequent Data Sharing 
Programme. A discussion on the viability of HMRC taking on full ownership of all 
repayment accounts is outlined in section 4.4. 
 
Targeted grants  
 
The number of targeted grants that the SLC administers has grown significantly over 
its 30 year history. As outlined in table 3, these grants, particularly Disabled Students’ 
Allowance (DSA) and Grants for Dependents (which include Adult Dependants Grants 
(ADG), Childcare Grant (CCG) and Parents' Learning Allowance (PLA)) drive up cost 
and complexity for the SLC as they require bespoke, time intensive processing. As 
explained in section 2.1, the SLC and DfE have undertaken quite a number of reforms 
to these products and are planning further consultation and improvements. Coupled 
with the potential for the Post-18 Review to recommend significant reforms, it would 
not be advised to make significant outsourcing changes at this point. Instead this 
                                            
 
31 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/1183/1183.pdf 
p. 18 
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period provides a useful window to explore how the wider package of reforms can be 
configured, alongside the Transformation Programme, to deliver a systems wide offer 
that make most sense for students, institutions and the tax payer.  
 
Policy complexity  
 
It is worth noting that it is not just the complexity of function that drives cost and 
inefficiencies for the SLC, but also the piece meal and complicated policy rules that sit 
behind these (66% of product-related cost). 
 
  
Figure 15: Proportion of policy and non-policy linked costs 
Source: SLC 
 
The highest related costs are associated with establishing complex entitlement rules 
and with repayment protocols. Potential savings are concentrated in streamlining 
residency and identity rules, means testing, qualifications status and over-repayments.  
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Table 13: Cost by policy process 
Source: SLC 
 
Recommendation 31 
The Student Finance Policy team should conduct a review across products (and 
specialist grants in particular) to identify where means testing and eligibility 
protocols can be rationalised and streamlined. This should be conducted while 
being conscious of potential changes that the post-18 review may recommend and 
with recourse to lessons learned from the process of amalgamating benefits and 
assessment processes under Universal Credit at the DWP. 
 
The same questions used for assessing the SLC’s structural form have been utilised 
for assessing various functional options.    
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Figure 16: Assessment of functional options  
 
Source: Tailored Review analysis 
 
As with changes in structural form, significant shifts in the functional model of the SLC 
are not recommended at this point in its transformation cycle, both because they would 
draw away vital resource and capacity and also because the SLC’s IT systems are not 
stable enough to safely support significant data or business architecture restructures. 
It may be the case that these options become viable in the longer term and 
recommendations to explore this are outlined in section 4.4. 
Partial Outsourcing 
The area that is viable for action over the next 3-5 years is the development of SLC’s 
strategy on outsourcing parts of its business functions. Public sector organisations 
often find it necessary and cost effective to outsource some services rather than 
provide them internally, as outlined in Managing Public Money (MPM)32. The SLC’s 
operations involve a number of processing stages and component functions. Some of 
these, such as contact centre, postal and debt collection services are already partially 
outsourced.  Outsourcing other parts of the business to external organisations may 
provide the SLC with specialist expertise, alongside improved effectiveness and value 
for money. 
                                            
 
32https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/managing-public-money   
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This Tailored Review has considered the following functions as potential areas for 
further outsourcing: 
• IT;   
• back office functions such as HR and legal; and  
• supporting the loan sale programme 
as everything else that is viable for outsourcing is already done so. MPM advises that 
it is usually desirable for public sector organisations to draw up an outline business 
case to help evaluate whether outsourcing makes operational and financial sense. 
This Tailored Review has conducted a high level analysis on partial outsourcing by: 
• considering which existing contracts are likely to end soon; 
• analysing the SLC’s spend over the last 4 years (2014-2018); 
• considering the wider strategic requirements of the company; and 
• considering the interests of the DAs. 
IT support 
The SLC’s IT supplier spend has increased exponentially over recent years due its 
outdated IT architecture and recruitment and retention challenges, accounting for 
more than half of its contractor spend. It has also suffered from poor IT vendor contract 
relationships in the past. In addition, the SLC’s current approach to IT outsourcing is 
hampered by having to be reactive to the annual policy commissioning cycle, and the 
absence of a multi-year funding settlement.  This has meant that, historically, it has 
been difficult for the SLC to get suppliers aligned to outcome based pricing as they are 
unwilling to incur risks. Crown Commercial Service (CCS) agreements are typically for 
2 years (and are not always appropriate for SLC objectives), and the SLC 
consequently relies on quarterly statements of work that reduce economies of scope 
and value for money. The SLC has also historically had under-developed commercial 
acumen and limited engagement and leverage across government via CCS and GDS. 
Given that data integrity and IT systems are one if its fundamental business enablers, 
it will be crucial for the SLC to secure the right IT partners to support the 
Transformation Programme. 
Recommendation 32 
The SLC should focus on securing a few strategic IT partners on a multi-year 
footing based on payment by results with shared accountability and mixed teams. 
This should incorporate lessons learned from previously unsuccessful and 
contentious IT contracting and be based on a risk appropriate migration plan, 
cross checked against the Transformation Programme. 
 
Business support functions 
 
Historically, the SLC has not routinely outsourced or moved to a shared services 
model for their back office functions such as HR, legal, commercial etc, and has not 
fully explored options for doing so. 
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One area that is making early headway is the pension arrangement. Pension costs 
have increased significantly (by 77% from FY 2014-15 to FY 2017-18), a 
consequence of the SLC’s employer's contributions rising from 15% to 27% to 
address issues of underfunding. DfE and the SLC have been working with the SLC 
Scheme Trustees, Cabinet Office, HMT and the Government Actuary’s Department 
to identify a long-term, affordable solution to place the scheme on a more 
sustainable footing, and provide secure pension benefits for SLC staff. A staff 
consultations on this will begin in Summer 2019. 
Recommendation 33 
The SLC should commit to investigating options for shared services contracting for 
back office functions. 
 
Commercial Strategy 
The SLC’s commercial approach to date has been largely tactical rather than strategic 
and heavily reliant on expensive contractors hired on a Time and Materials basis or 
inefficient framework arrangements. This approach, however, is beginning to mature. 
The Company is beginning to withdraw from frameworks that are not providing results 
or value for money e.g. some Indesser services. In IT services, the SLC is moving 
towards a partnership model, engaging with the CCS and GDS, and looking to have 2 
partners for platform and 2 for software (contracts which went to market in early 2019). 
The SLC has also engaged with DVLA and DWP to understand lessons learned in 
outsourcing IT projects. However, the SLC’s relationship with central government 
commercial and procurement is still developing, and there is often a difficulty with 
regular communication and leveraging of cross-government expertise.   
Recommendation 34 
CCS and the SLC should consider options for greater cross government 
collaboration and commercial leverage, including highlighting performance data 
and feedback on framework commissioned services 
 
Loan sale support  
Currently, the loan book sales are carried out in a multi-departmental approach with 
the DfE Permanent Secretary acting as Accounting Officer (AO), responsible for end 
to end sale oversight, and UKGI acting as Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) and 
project base leading the sale. The SLC has to provide well packaged, clean, detailed 
data bundles of Management Information to aid the sales transaction team in UKGI 
and conduct a detailed asset rationalisation process to verify the annual distribution(s) 
of funds to investors. Approximately 30-40 staff are involved in managing the loans 
sales (across all of the organisations), with an annual cost of c. £10million.  
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Figure 17: Loan sales process 
Source: Tailored Review analysis 
Based on the current demand from UKGI, long term planning and forecasting for future 
loan sales has indicated that it will be challenging for current SLC capacity to meet the 
anticipated demand for the future annual reporting cycle and delivery expectations,  if 
the full programme is executed (capacity for near term sales is set out earlier in the 
document). An optimisation programme is underway to develop this capacity, with 
further detail being developed in coming months. 
The Transformation Programme  
 
Currently, many of the SLC’s products are overly complicated, interlinked and 
expensive to develop and maintain. The data which the SLC and UKGI currently rely 
on for the loan sale programme is distributed across a number of systems. This lacks 
clear ownership, suffers from quality issues and underutilises opportunities for data 
sharing – which has resulted in the need to exclude some loans from Sales 1 and 2.  
 
An integral part of optimisation, therefore, will be for the SLC to improve its data 
management. The Transformation Programme will standardise data management 
across the SLC by developing a data target operating model, which includes updated 
processes and tools to deliver clear data ownership, lineage, standards and quality. 
The Company will establish standards for data sharing with other government 
departments, including HMRC. Reducing the amount of errors and data issues will 
help improve the repayments system as a whole and potentially enable more accounts 
to be packaged and more easily managed for future loan sales.  
 
Whilst this activity, alongside the additional initiatives outlined in section 3.3, may well 
address the longer term capacity demands for the loan sale programme, a number of 
alternative longer term options could also be considered: 
1) fully outsourcing to an new Asset Management company  
2) an existing organisation taking on all of the loan sale functions, such as UKGI 
3) significantly increasing the internal resource at SLC and bringing it all in-house 
4) a mixed model 
 
1) Asset management company 
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As a successful AssetCo, UK Asset Resolution Limited (UKAR) was assessed to 
better understand the benefits of this model. UKAR was set up and financed by HMT 
in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. It was established as an NDPB to manage 
the asset book from both Bradford and Bingley and Northern Rock Asset Management 
(NRAM). As of April 2019, 93% of the £11 billion government loans have been repaid.  
UKAR had its own strategic board and CEO, responsible for its own profit-loss 
account. Crucially, it did not have any ‘new’ business generated year on year, meaning 
that the business had a finite number of loans it was selling on behalf of government 
with an ever-decreasing balance sheet. UKAR took on the sales of these loans in their 
entirety, meaning the organisation was responsible for the decisions around what to 
sell, administering the loans, the selling process and continued to administer the loans 
post-sale, including analysis of the data stream.  
UKAR was also able to generate its own income to become a fully self-funded 
organisation, by selling its administration arm to a third party company, which meant 
it was able to invest in its workforce. This is an important point, since securitisation 
and analytical experts are highly sought after, and the recruitment pool is relatively 
small. There is a lot of direct competition with banks for this expertise, who will be able 
to offer high financial incentives. 
Based on a rudimentary look at UKAR’s financing, it is estimated that the cost of setting 
up a new AssetCo with 30-50 analytical and securitisation staff, would be in the region 
of £20-30 million per annum. In addition, it should be noted that many of the functions 
of UKAR were in place from legacy businesses, which meant that it already had 
embedded professional resources, processes and knowledge. Setting up and staffing 
a new institution entirely from scratch is likely to incur additional costs and challenges.  
Another significant point to note is that an AssetCo established without a pre-existing 
institution to sell an open student finance loan book subject to policy changes and 
income contingent repayments inherently carries more risk than the UKAR model 
which is selling a closed mortgage loan book from the pre-existing framework of a 
private financial institutions. Apart from the funding investment, the key issue with this 
model is the significant risk and complexity involved in any data migration from the 
SLC.  
For these reasons – and others – UKGI have given an initial view that this would not 
be a viable option for delivering the Plan 1 loan sale programme as currently planned. 
2) UKGI taking on all of the loan sale functions 
UKGI is seemingly the most suitable existing organisation to take on the loan sales at 
the current time, since it is already integrally involved in the current process. However, 
there is little evidence that UKGI could, or would, be in a position to take on the addition 
of the data cleansing work that the SLC currently undertakes, as it is not their area of 
expertise. In addition, this option would face the same issues with data migration as 
setting up an AssetCo.  
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It would be important for the integrity of UKGI to do this expansion without creating a 
new entity within the organisation, or without changing the fundamental business of 
the organisation, which may be difficult due to the volume of resource the loan sale 
would need. 
3) SLC taking on all of the loan sale functions  
A third option would be for the SLC to establish its own analytical and securitisation 
teams and bring the whole loan sales operation in house. This would be a significant 
change for the company and would require a substantial up-front investment and a 
non-trivial shift in organisational focus and culture. Although not insurmountable, it is 
not entirely clear how the SLC would overcome its historic issues of struggling to 
recruit high end and in demand expertise. There might also be the issue of a clash 
with DA interests, as, as it stands, neither the SLC nor the DAs receive any percentage 
of the revenue that is sold (e.g. for re-investment in service delivery), meaning that 
there may be a real, or perceived, disincentives for the DA shareholders to prioritise 
this work in addition to the core business. 
Growing resource at the SLC and UKGI within the existing model 
This option benefits from causing the least amount of disruption and reducing the 
inherent risks of moving large amounts of data, while shoring up resources for 
administration and data management to bolster capacity for the loan sale programme 
in the longer term. 
As part of the optimisation work and Transformation Programme, if the SLC can 
increase and improve its specialist resource and IT capacity for data management, it 
could feasibly cope with an increase to administer all additional loan sales. UKGI is 
likely to be able to continue to lead on the sale itself given the processes and 
protocols already established. As confidence and capacity in the SLC grows, via the 
Transformation Programme, the goal will be for it to augment the size, expertise and 
tools of its data management and sale support team, and have strong incentives, 
including in house learning and development opportunities, to improve recruitment 
and retention. 
Recommendation 35 
The SLC and UKGI should focus on optimising in house resource, data and IT 
capacity within the existing loan sales model. If required, future options on 
outsourcing should be investigated via a full feasibility study commissioned by 
HMT in partnership with the SLC, UKGI and DfE. 
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4.4 Future Options 
While the scope of this Tailored Review is focused on changes that can be feasibly 
delivered in the next 3-5 years, it is recognised that there may be additional 
opportunities to deliver wider benefits over a longer time horizon once the 
Transformation Programme has been delivered and the implications of EU Exit and 
the Post-18 Review have been established. 
 
Figure 18: Future options for the SLC 
Source: Tailored Review analysis 
HMRC taking over all repayments 
The SLC has a working relationship with HMRC, which collects approximately 85% of 
loan repayments via PAYE and Self-Assessment. The SLC directly collects the 
remainder of loan repayments for those outside of the UK tax system.   
A number of stakeholders raised the potential benefits of HMRC taking over 
administration of all of the repayments and associated accounts, which would allow 
the SLC to focus on the ‘apply, assess and pay’ front end of the business. 
Consolidating this arrangement to be fully administered through HMRC would mean 
that all repayment activity is centralised in one place, which could potentially improve 
handling of accounts and reduce data sharing requirements. It might also improve the 
customer experience and capitalise on HMRC expertise.  
There are, however, a number of considerations that would need to be properly 
worked through, including HMRC’s IT and resource capacity, the split of ministerial 
responsibility and whether any gains would be marginal given the introduction of the 
More Frequent Data Sharing programme. In addition, splitting the payment and 
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repayment function might risk fragmenting the customer journey, with different data 
platforms and transfers, which could impact on data integrity and a smooth customer 
interface e.g. SLC no longer having complete access to the statement of account for 
an applicant and therefore not easily being able to see whether the student has had 
a previous loan and the status of that loan.  It is also likely to be difficult for the SLC 
to decouple the correct data in a fast and efficient way to transfer the back book over 
to HMRC. 
This option would not be feasible in the next 3-5 years but might be tenable beyond 
this, once the SLC is on a more stable footing.  
Recommendation 36 
DfE should commission HMRC (in partnership with the SLC) to carry out a 
comprehensive feasibility study (in the next 3 years) to explore the viability of 
HMRC taking on the repayment accounts in their entirety. This should be have 
reference to any loan sale support servicing feasibility study (see recommendation 
35). 
 
Further split of functions between the Devolved Administrations 
As explained in section 2.1, the SLC conducts 4 main functions; apply; assess; pay 
and repay. For England and Wales, the company manages the full, end-to-end 
process for students, and for Scotland (for loans) and Northern Ireland it provides the 
payment and repayment parts of the service. Additionally, Northern Ireland’s 
Education Authority uses SLC-developed systems for assessing their students’ 
applications. 
 
Differences in front-end eligibility between England and Wales drives cost and 
complexity, therefore, if feasible, an option could involve Wales administering their 
own apply and assess functions, as per the current process in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. 
Section 3.4 outlined the various studies and reviews being undertaken by the DAs. 
Given the current uncertainties in the system, none of the DAs have signalled that they 
are minded to enact a further significant separation of functions, not least because of 
the prohibitive cost and complexity of doing so.    
Recommendation 37 
Shareholders should not enact functional splits at this stage, given the fragility of 
the SLC’s IT infrastructure. Any future splits should be conducted once the 
Transformation Programme has been fully embedded, and aligned with any 
systems changes as result of the various reviews currently being undertaken and 
EU Exit. 
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SLC name change  
The Augar Review states that: 
 
We recommend that communication of the student finance system, including 
by government departments and agencies, should be significantly improved 
and updated…The language of loans and debt is deeply embedded in public 
discourse about the student finance system and will not be eradicated without 
a comprehensive, targeted and sustained communications strategy.  
We envisage that our proposals would become a new student finance plan with 
a new name to represent more accurately the new system: the “student 
contributions system”. This should include a public engagement campaign to 
introduce wider changes being made to the student finance system and ensure 
they are properly understood by students, parents and the media from the 
beginning. Finally, government should also consider renaming the ‘Student 
Loans Company’. We recognise that the primary legislation underpinning the 
student finance system uses the term ‘loans’ and the terminology common to 
loans (borrower, rates of interest, repayment, liability, etc.) and that this 
constrains the extent to which the government is able to change the terminology 
used. We believe that the government should seek changes to this terminology 
ahead of the introduction of a new system33.   
Since the SLC is a large and multi-faceted organisation, any rebranding would be 
complex. The SLC estimates that it has close to 800 customer-facing forms that would 
need to be changed, plus web content, internal documents and a range of third-party 
owned information such as HEI websites.  
The SLC suggests that a public consultation, with a focus on customers, would be 
necessary before implementation, which would need to cover both brand perception 
of the change - explaining why and what difference this would make to the customer - 
as well as outlining the resource implications connected to front facing websites, 
partner channels and engagement activities. There are also likely to be legal 
implications given that the primary legislation underpinning the student finance system 
uses the term ‘loans’ and the terminology common to loans (borrower, rates of interest, 
repayment, liability, etc). 
                                            
 
33 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/post-18-review-of-education-and-
funding-independent-panel-report p. 176 
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Recommendation 38 
Consideration on a name change for the SLC should be taken forward as part of 
the government’s conclusion to the Post-18 review. The merits of a rebrand will 
need to weighed alongside value for money, legislative considerations and timing 
with the Transformation Programme. 
 
Forward Look 
Given the volume of change and uncertainty in the next few years, and the 
recommendations in this chapter for various feasibility studies, it will be useful for 
another strategic review of the SLC to be conducted sooner than the typical 5 years 
recommended by Tailored Review guidance. Annex H also outlines the critical activity 
that will need to be conducted over the next 18 months to 2 years and beyond in 
support of the recommendations and long term objectives outlined. 
Recommendation 39 
The next Tailored Review of the SLC should be conducted in 3 years.  
The sponsorship team should agree a clear action plan for the implementation of 
the recommendations.. 
 
Figure 19 plots the relative criticality of each recommendation and how far activity has 
already been undertaken to address them. The most pressing recommendations - in 
terms of being most critical with least existing activity to date - are: 
Recommendation 3 
Robust programme management governance should be established to oversee the 
implementation of the Transformation Programme  
Recommendation 5  
The policy commissioning process should be reformed 
Recommendation 17 
Shareholders should agree to operate in a more typical GovCo NDPB arrangement; 
setting the objectives, priorities and budget within a specified deadline, and giving the 
ELT and Board more autonomy to deliver   
Recommendation 38 
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Consideration on a name change for the SLC should be taken forward as part of the 
government’s conclusion to the Post-18 review.  
Recommendation 35 
The SLC and UKGI should focus on optimising in house resource, data and IT capacity 
within the existing loan sales model. If required, future options on outsourcing should 
be investigated via a full feasibility study.  
Recommendation 31 
The Student Finance Policy team should conduct a review across products (and 
specialist grants in particular) to identify where means testing and eligibility protocols 
can be rationalised and streamlined.
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Figure 19: Criticality vs. Activity underway 
Source: Tailored Review analysis 
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Annex A – Terms of Reference 
Purpose 
To carry out a tailored review of the Student Loans Company (SLC) in accordance 
with Cabinet Office guidance34. The review will assess: 
i) The current ‘operational health’ of the SLC, looking at whether it remains fit for 
purpose and is well governed and run effectively and efficiently. Given a 
number of recent reviews, this will be a light touch assessment.   
ii) How the SLC should be structured within the next 5-10 years to optimise 
effectiveness and efficiency.  
The aim of a tailored review is to take a holistic look at an ALB to ensure that its form 
best enables it to deliver its objectives, alongside looking at governance, efficiencies 
and opportunities for more effective working. Cabinet Office oversee the overall 
programme of Tailored Reviews, but departments are responsible for delivering the 
individual reviews for their ALBs. The review report will be published on GOV.UK 
and make recommendations for improvement where applicable. 
Background 
The SLC is a non-profit making Government-owned organisation, which disperses 
loans35 and grants to students in universities and colleges in the UK. The SLC was 
set up as a Company Limited by Shares under the Companies Act, was incorporated 
in 1989 and began operating in 1990. The SLC has been classified as an executive 
NDPB since 1996 and its current shareholding structure (Department for Education 
(DfE) (85%), Advanced Learning and Science Directorate (Scotland) (5%), Skills, 
Higher Education & Lifelong Learning (Wales) (5%) and the Department of the 
Economy (Northern Ireland) (5%)) has been in place since 2013.  
The primary roles of the SLC are: 
• To make payments to individuals, Higher Education (HE) institutions and 
Further Education (FE) institutions in accordance with the student support 
                                            
 
34 Tailored Reviews of Public Bodies: Guidance, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tailored-reviews-of-public-bodies-
guidance  
35 In this context, ‘loans’ refers to Income Contingent Repayment products, rather than more 
traditionally defined loans. As such, repayment is a function of what a borrower earns, rather than 
what is owed. 
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regulations and relevant public policy objectives. This includes managing and 
developing a range of products and services tailored to the requirements of 
the government administrations. 
• To ensure repayments (whether through HMRC or direct to the SLC) are 
collected on time from those due to repay. 
• To provide accurate and timely information to students/customers and to 
inform the shareholders’ policy making and analysis. 
• To support the effective management and sale of the student loan book. 
The SLC currently has c.3000 employees, services approximately 1.8 million 
applications per year, responds to 4.5 million calls and has over 8 million repaying or 
due to repay customers with loans totalling more than £115 billion.  
Given the scale and complexity of the organisation, this will be a Tier 1 tailored 
review (see exhibit 2 for more information). 
Previous Reviews  
UK Government Investments (UKGI) and the Department for Education recently 
conducted a joint governance review of the SLC to look at the current governance 
arrangements for the SLC, whether they are working well and potential 
improvements in the short- to medium-term. 
Objectives and Scope  
As noted above, tailored reviews assess whether ALBs remain fit for purpose by 
reviewing their capacity for delivering more effectively and efficiently, including 
identifying the potential for efficiency savings, and where appropriate, any alternative 
operating models.  
This tailored review will consider the following areas: 
Stage 1 – Assessment of current ‘operational health’  
• Form/function/effectiveness - the status, form, function and continuing 
requirement for the SLC will be assessed, looking at how well the SLC is 
delivering its objectives and priorities, the effectiveness of its current strategy, 
and its performance relative to similar organisations. 
• Governance – the review will assess whether the SLC is complying with the 
recognised principles of good corporate governance set out in the Code of 
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Good Practice36. This will largely summarise and build on the work conducted 
in in the joint DfE/UKGI governance review.  
• Efficiency – the review will examine whether the SLC is operating in a way 
which provides value for money. This will include assessing the cost 
efficiencies of factors such as staffing, digital functions, estates and debt 
management.  
Stage 2 – Analysis of contextual factors  
In order to assess potential alternative delivery models, an understanding is required 
of the contextual factors within which the SLC will need to operate within 5-10 years. 
These will include:  
• Constitutional parameters - considerations around the operating environment 
after the UK has left the EU, and any relevant devolution issues. 
• Policy requirements – any HE/FE student financing legislative or policy 
requirements, particularly with reference to developing recommendations from 
the Post-18 Review, where feasible and appropriate.  
• Financial considerations – reviewing the loan book strategy and sale, and any 
investment needs or restrictions on the SLC. 
• Technological developments – a high level understanding of any key 
innovations or threats e.g. cyber security, functional capacity, A.I/big data, 
HMRC developments (RTI etc), GDPR etc 
• Claimant and customer base – modelling the trajectories for the potential 
claimant and loan base, as well as understating their contextual factors e.g. % 
likely to move abroad etc.  
Stage 3 – Agreement of general operating principles 
Using the salient insights from Stage 2 to agree a set of operating principles for a 
future organisation e.g. flexibility and capacity to add new 1-2 products every year, 
reducing operating costs by X% by 2028 etc. 
                                            
 
36 Cabinet Office & HM Treasury, (2017), ‘Corporate Governance in Central Government 
Departments: Code of Good Practice’, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/corporate-
governance-code-for-central-government-departments-2017 
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Stage 4 – Shortlisting different operating models 
Using the agreed operating principles, we will assess the viability of a number of 
potential operating models for the SLC (as per Exhibit 1), with a view to shortlisting 
1-3 options. 
Exhibit 1. Potential operating models for the SLC 
 
Stage 5 – Assessing viability of shortlisted operating models  
Once the shortlist of 1-3 operating models has been agreed, these will be assessed 
for their viability against the following factors: 
• Flexibility and capacity to deliver against ministerial objectives  
• Value for money/cost benefit analysis/potential efficiency savings 
• Risks/legal considerations 
• Estates and location 
• Personnel considerations  
• IT/digital considerations 
• High level implementation considerations 
Methodology 
Evidence Gather 
The review will gather evidence in a range of ways including:  
All elements 
administered by 
central 
government 
All elements 
administered by 
private 
institution(s) 
Bring in 
house 
Merge with 
another 
body 
Continued 
delivery by 
an NDPB 
Move out of 
central 
government 
Commercial 
model Abolish 
Bring SLC 
closer into 
central govt 
(Agency 
model) e.g. 
 
HMT 
management 
of the loan 
book and/or 
HMRC 
management 
 
Current SLC 
model 
(GovCo/ 
NDPB) 
Moving SLC 
further from 
central govt 
(Sponsor 
model) e.g. 
 
Fully/part 
privatisation 
or charging 
for services 
e.g. Passport 
 
1 2 4 5 6 3 
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• desk based analysis of a range of sources and reviews  
• engagement with the SLC (in the form of site visits and interviews with staff)  
• liaison with a wide range of stakeholders and functional leads 
• testing with the internal steering group (information below) 
• testing with the Challenge Panel (information below)  
Timing 
The end-to-end review is anticipated to last 6 months between October 18 - March 
19 (from confirming the review scope to the report being completed).  Some 
additional time may be required for onwards liaison with the Cabinet Office and final 
approvals ahead of report publication, as well as post publication close down activity.  
Review Team and Governance 
Review Team 
The review is conducted on behalf of the Secretary of State. A small, dedicated 
review team will be the day-to-day contacts for the SLC and will produce the final 
report. The review team will be led by an individual independent of the company and 
sponsor function, and will include members drawn from across the DfE and SLC.  
The review team will be:  
• Lead Reviewer – Simone Bolshaw 
• Reviewer – Laura deSilva 
• Reviewer – Rumaana Rahman 
• Review support – Madeleine Firth (SLC)  
• Team support – Steven Strachan  
Although Cabinet Office guidance does not allow organisations being reviewed, or 
their sponsors, to directly steer the review, they will be closely involved as the review 
progresses:  
• The review team will agree Terms of Reference (TOR) with the CEO of SLC, 
and its Departmental sponsors 
• The review team will work with the SLC to set up interviews, conduct site 
visits and ensure it understands the evidence base 
• The approach will be iterative and the review team will share emerging 
findings and recommendations with the SLC and its sponsors throughout, 
where appropriate  
• Interim drafts and the final report will be produced in draft and then finalised 
following discussion with the SLC and sponsors.  
120 
Governance  
The review team will be supported by the ALB Partnership Team and will also 
establish an steering group to help sense check and steer emerging analysis and 
recommendations. It is envisaged that the steering group would meet approximately 
once a month and provide project oversight and support with framing content and 
leveraging across government if/as required. They would not be required to formally 
‘sign off’ review chapters.   
As a Cabinet Office defined Tier 1 review, the SLC review will also have a Challenge 
Panel to test and challenge the assumptions and conclusions of the review team. 
They will provide insight and feedback drawing on their own expertise and 
experience, but not be required to formally ‘sign off’ review chapters. It is anticipated 
that the Challenge Panel will meet 3 times throughout the review. 
Report clearance and post review activity  
As this is a Tier 1 review, formal sign off will be required by the DfE’s Secretary of 
State, Permanent Secretary and relevant DGs and Directors, as well as the Minister 
for the Constitution (as per Exhibit 2).  
The education ministers of the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish devolved 
administrations will also be consulted on the review before publication. 
Exhibit 2. Clearance required for different tiers of TRs 
 
It will be the responsibility of the DfE (via its sponsorship team) to organise a 
response to the review recommendations and any implementation activity supporting 
this. 
Annex B – List of interviewees and governance group members 
Interviewees 
 
Name Role Organisation 
Paula Sussex CEO SLC 
David Wallace Deputy CEO & Chief Customer Officer SLC 
Jonathan Slater Permanent Secretary DfE 
Ben Connah DD, SLC Sponsorship Team DfE 
Laura King Head of Governance, SLC Sponsorship DfE 
Daniel Foster Head of SLC Strategy, SLC Sponsorship DfE 
David Ross SLC Sponsorship team DfE 
David Laing SLC Sponsorship team DfE 
Claire Allan Student Funding Policy DfE 
Amanda Fenn Advanced Learner Loans DfE 
Camilla Reinert Student Loan Repayments DfE 
Iain King Finance Director  DfE 
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Name Role Organisation 
Paul Williams DD, Student Funding Policy DfE 
Ben Coates DD, Student Information and Choice DfE 
Gregory Boone Disabled Students Policy Team Leader DfE 
Shirley Letts Student Support Lead DfE 
Glenna Pryor Student Finance  DfE 
Jonathan Clear Strategic Finance Director DfE 
Jeremy Gould Digital Services DfE 
Chris Jones Higher Education Welsh government 
Chris Williams Higher Education Welsh government 
Jonathan O'Callaghan Department of the Economy 
Northern Ireland 
government 
Gareth Allen Policy Manager Student Financial Support Team Scottish government 
Leia Fitzgerald Policy Manager Student Financial Support Team Scottish government 
Chris Brodie SLC Chair SLC 
Natalie Elphicke Non Executive Director SLC 
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Name Role Organisation 
David Gravells Non Executive Director SLC 
Simon Devonshire Non Executive Director SLC 
Andrew Wathey Non Executive Director SLC 
Mary Curnock-Cook Non Executive Director SLC 
Ben Alexander Crown Commercial Lead Cabinet Office 
Ciara Chivers Corporate Finance Cabinet Office 
Chad Woodward Former Executive Director UKGI 
Sandy Moreira Assistant Director UKGI 
Daniela Guzzardo Assistant Director  UKGI 
Helen Mitchell Legal  UKGI 
Peter Lauener Former interim CEO SLC 
Jacqui Smillie Executive Leadership Team (Chief Financial Officer)  SLC 
Bernice McNaught 
Executive Leadership Team (Executive Director, Repayments and Counter Fraud 
Services)  
SLC 
Derek Ross Executive Leadership Team (Executive Director, Operations)  SLC 
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Name Role Organisation 
Gary Wormesley Executive Leadership Team (Company Secretary)  SLC 
Adrian Tucker Executive Leadership Team (Chief Information Officer)  SLC 
Maggie Wightman Director - Policy, Design and Change SLC 
Lindsay Brown Product design  SLC 
Steve McCready Head of Spend Assurance GDS 
Colin Smith British Council FCO 
Sarah Jaegar Higher Education HMT 
Siddharth Varma Enterprise and Growth Unit HMT 
Andrew Busby Post-18 Policy DfE 
Simon Dadd Senior Policy Advisor DeXEU 
Rejwan Uddin Policy Advisor DeXEU 
Blake Patel Policy Advisor DeXEU 
Paula Crofts EU Exit Programme BEIS 
Nolan Smith Director of resources, finance and transformation Office for students 
Richard Puttock Head of data, foresight and analysis Office for students 
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Name Role Organisation 
Rachel Nixon Deputy Director NICS Policy and Student Finance HMRC 
Neil Nicholas Head of Student Finance HMRC 
Sally Swait Head of Product and Proposition NS&I 
Diane Henderson HR Director UKAR 
Isabella Watson Strategic Assurance Lead Cabinet Office 
Saima Mirza Senior Policy Advisor, Public Bodies Team Cabinet Office 
Ben Norman Senior Manager Bank of England 
Adam Horsler Senior Manager Bank of England 
Emma Maloney Public Chair’s Forum Manager Institute for Government  
Susanna Smith Membership, Communications and Research Officer Institute for Government 
Ian Todd Former Chief Executive STA 
Richard Banks Former Chief Executive UKAR 
Sir James Leigh-
Pemberton 
Former Executive Chairman UKFI 
Ceri Smith Director UKGI 
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Name Role Organisation 
Ian Burrows Manager of large retail lenders FCA 
Sarah Jane Hannah Financial Accounting Manager SLC 
Sally Winstanley CRO, Europe and Retail Funds Aviva  
Mark Gray Chief Risk Officer Homes England 
Matt Smith  Legal  DfE 
Challenge Panel 
Name Role Organisation 
Richard Pennycook (Chair) DfE Non-Executive Director DfE 
James Leigh-Pemberton  Former Executive Chairman UK Financial Investment 
Richard Banks  Former Chief Executive UK Asset Resolution  
Paul Feldman  Chief Executive Jisc  
Nicola Dandridge Chief Executive Office for Students 
Alistair Jarvis Chief Executive Universities UK 
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Name Role Organisation 
Mark Keene Assistant Director Partnership & Operations NS&I 
Dax Harkins B2B Director NS&I 
Sarah Randall-Paley Chair British Universities Financial Directors Group 
Kuljit Dhillon Deputy Director Public Bodies Team, Cabinet Office 
Francesca Conlon Deputy Director Public Bodies Team, Cabinet Office 
Niva Thiruchelvam Deputy Director Education and Skills, HMT  
Jon Sell Deputy Director Corporate Finance, HMT 
Sharon Harrison-Barker Academic Registrars Council Academic Registrar 
Steering Group 
Name Role Organisation 
Emran Mian Former Director General Higher and Further Education, DfE 
Paul Kett Director General Higher and Further Education, DfE 
Matt Toombs Director Student Finance, DfE 
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Name Role Organisation 
Sinead O'Sullivan Director Career Learning, Analysis, Skills and Student Choice, DfE 
Sarah Butterfield Head of ALB’s Partnership Programme DfE 
Paul Bond Senior Finance Business Partner  Further Education, DfE 
Siddharth Varma Policy Advisor Enterprise and Growth Unit, HMT 
Sarah Jaeger Policy Advisor Higher Education, HMT 
Alex Reeves  Executive Director UKGI 
Chris Williams Skills, Higher Education & Lifelong Learning Welsh government 
Leia Fitzgerald Advanced Learning and Science Directorate Scottish government 
Jonathan O'Callaghan Department of the Economy Northern Ireland government 
Ben Connah Deputy Director SLC Sponsorship Team, DfE 
Laura King Head of Governance SLC Sponsorship Team, DfE 
Madeline Firth Business Manager to the Office of the CEO Student Loans Company 
Elliot Brinkworth Strategic Assurance Lead Public Bodies Reform, Cabinet Office 
Saima Mirza Strategic Assurance Lead Public Bodies Reform, Cabinet Office 
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Name Role Organisation 
Rachel Nixon 
Deputy Director, NICS Policy and Student 
Finance 
Customer Strategy and Design, HMRC 
Neil Nicholas Head of Student Finance Customer Strategy and Design, HMRC 
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Annex C – Responsibilities of both a Government Company (GovCo) and NDPB  
Companies Act obligations 
The Directors of a GovCo have 7 general duties under the Companies Act 2006 (with their Section numbers in Companies Act 2006): 
• To act within the directors’ powers (section 171) 
o A Director of a company must act in accordance with the company’s constitution and only exercise powers for the 
purpose for which they are conferred.  
 
• To promote the success of the company and to act in good faith (section 172) 
o A director of a company must act in in the way they consider, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. In so doing, the director must have regard 
(among other matters) to: 
 The likely consequences of any decision in the long term; 
 The interests of the company’s employees; 
 the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; 
 the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment; 
 the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct; and 
 The need to act fairly between members of the company. 
 
• To exercise independent judgement (section 173) 
•  
• To exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (section 174) 
o This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with –  
 the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the 
functions carried out by the director in relation to the company (the objective test); and 
 the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has (the subjective test). 
 
• To avoid conflict of interests (section 175) 
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o A director of a company must avoid a situation in which they have, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that 
conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company; 
o This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether 
the company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity); 
o This duty does not apply to a conflict of interest arising in relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company. 
 
• Not to accept benefits from third parties (section 176) 
 
• To declare interest in proposed transactions or arrangements (section 177) 
All these duties except the section 174 duty (to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence) are fiduciary duties. 
A director of a limited liability company does not have personal liability if acting in accordance with his duties.  
NDPB – Governance obligations 
• In addition to the fiduciary duties outlined above, government owned companies as NDPBs must also: 
 
• comply with central government guidance on parliamentary funding and accountability (as set out in Managing Public 
Money) 
• be fully consolidated into the financial accounts and Supply Estimates of their sponsoring department 
• have an Accounting Officer, appointed by the Principal AO of the sponsor department 
• comply with delegated authorities form the Treasury and sponsor department and to seek approval for any non-delegated 
spending. 
 
A GovCo NDPB’s income and expenditure are subject to Parliamentary accountability and spending control, regardless of whether 
that income is given out form central government funds, or raised from fees and charges. This springs from the principle set out in 
Lord Sharman’s 2001 report Holding to Account: The Review of Audit and Accountability in Central Government, that ‘public money’ 
is all money that comes into the possession of, or is distributed by, a public body. 
• https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081023195427/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/38.pdf (see in particular paragraph 
2.22) 
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Annex D - High level assessment of the SLC’s governance against Tailored Review 
Guidance 
 
Principle Summary RAG 
rating 
Review findings 
Accountability 
Statutory 
Accountability 
The public body complies with all applicable statutes 
and regulations, and other relevant statements of 
best practice. 
G/A • The SLC broadly complies with the principles and 
policies set out in the HMT publication Managing 
Public Money and Cabinet Office/HM Treasury 
spending controls. However there have been 
some instances of delegations breaches or limited 
understanding of government accounting 
practices. These are being addressed with extra 
training 
• The SLC is compliant with the Data Protection 
legislation, the Public Records Acts and the 
Freedom of Information Act 
Accountability 
for Public Money  
The accounting officer of the public body is personally 
responsible and accountable to Parliament for the 
use of public money by the body and for the 
stewardship of assets. 
G • There is a designated Accounting Officer in place, 
and the role is outlined in the Framework 
document 
• The SLC has arrangements in place to ensure 
public funds are safeguarded and deliver vfm 
• The SLC’s annual accounts have been laid before 
parliament each year on time 
Ministerial 
Accountability 
The minister is ultimately accountable to Parliament 
and the public for the overall performance of the 
public body 
G • Accountability arrangements are set out in the 
Framework document between the shareholders, 
and the SLC  
• The Minister(s), shareholders and sponsorship 
team exercise scrutiny and appropriate oversight 
of the SLC 
 
 
133 
 
Principle Summary RAG 
rating 
Review findings 
• The Minister is consulted on the appointment of 
the chief executive, and meets with them on a fairly 
regular basis (recent improvements) 
• The annual report informs Parliament of the SLC’s 
activities, alongside oral questions 
Roles and responsibilities 
Role of the 
Sponsoring 
Department  
There is a sponsor team within the department that 
provides appropriate oversight and scrutiny of, and 
support and assistance to, the public body. 
G/A • The sponsorship team provides oversight of the 
SLC, although historically it has not always had full 
visibility over all requirements and requests 
• There is a framework document in place that sets 
out the aims, objectives and functions of the SLC, 
in accordance to Managing Public Money 
• There is regular and improving dialogue and 
support between the sponsoring department and 
the SLC, although there have been difficulties in 
developing mutual understanding   
Role of the 
Board 
The public body is led by an effective board which 
has collective responsibility for the overall 
performance and success of the body. The board 
provides strategic leadership, direction, support and 
guidance. 
A • The Board meets regularly but often acts in an 
advisory function rather than outlining strategic 
direction 
• Recruitment of board members is targeted to from 
a range of diverse backgrounds 
• The board has a remuneration committee that 
makes recommendations on the remunerations of 
the ELT 
• The Chair and sponsorship team should ensure 
that there is a regular evaluation of the 
performance of the board, the Chair and individual 
board members 
Role of the Chair  The chair is responsible for leadership of the board 
and for ensuring its overall effectiveness. 
G/A • The Framework document sets out the roles and 
responsibilities of the Chair 
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Principle Summary RAG 
rating 
Review findings 
• The Chair does not have objectives and 
performance reviewed on an annual basis 
• The role of the Chair and Chief Executive is held 
by different individuals 
• The duties, terms of office, remuneration of the 
Chair is set out in writing 
Role of Non-
Executive Board 
Members  
As part of their role, non-executive board members 
provide independent and constructive challenge. 
A • There is some confusion over the corporate status  
of non-executive board members with regards to 
enacting their fiduciary responsibilities  
• Transparent processes exist and are followed for 
the appointment of non-exec board members. 
• The Framework documents sets out the roles and 
responsibilities of the Non-Executive Board 
Members 
• The Non-Executive Board members do not always 
systematically  establish the strategic direction of 
the SLC 
Effective 
financial 
management  
The public body has taken appropriate steps to 
ensure that effective systems of financial 
management and internal control are in place 
G/A • The SLC publishes a balanced and 
understandable annual report complying with HM 
Treasury guidance 
• The SLC adheres to the Counter Fraud Functional 
Standards. It was last reviewed in April 2019 and 
achieved 11 out of the 12 Functional Standards, 
with the missed score relating to the Fraud 
Savings audit which had not been completed in 
time for evidence to be submitted, but is currently 
underway 
• There are some organisational capability issues 
around accurate forecasting, public finance 
knowledge and budget profiling which are being 
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Principle Summary RAG 
rating 
Review findings 
addressed with renewed training 
• There are clear protocols in place to ensure 
compliance with rules on claiming expenses 
• The SLC’s ARC is responsible for the independent 
review of the systems of internal control and the 
external audit process (working with NAO) 
Communications 
Communications  The body is open, transparent, accountable and 
responsive. 
G • The SLC board meets in public, and minutes and 
agendas are published online on slc.co.uk 
• Surveys are conducted with stakeholders as part 
of effective communication 
• The SLC engages and consults with the public on 
issues of real public interest 
• The SLC has an effective correspondence 
handling and complaints procedure 
Code and Conduct 
Conduct and 
Behaviour  
The board and staff of the public body work to the 
highest personal and professional standards. They 
promote the values of the body and of good 
governance through their conduct and behaviour. 
G • The SLC Code of Conduct incorporates the Civil 
Service Code 
• As part of the Student Loans Company's 
commitment to transparency, it publishes details of 
expenses incurred by its board and chief executive 
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Annex E - High level assessment of the SLC’s provision against Code of Good 
practice on Partnerships between departments and arm’s-length bodies 
 
Principle Summary Review findings RAG 
rating 
Purpose Partnerships work well when the purpose, 
objectives and roles of arm’s-length bodies 
(ALBs) are mutually understood; reviewed 
on a regular basis; and clearly set out in 
relevant documents. There is absolute 
clarity about lines of accountability and how 
the ALB’s purpose and objectives align with 
those of departments. 
 
• There is a broad consensus that further steps need to 
be taken to ensure the SLC’s purpose and objectives 
are mutually understood and fit for purpose.  
• The SLC has begun to review its governance 
structures, alongside the framework document which 
has recently been reviewed and updated. Formal 
delegations have been established with the SLC and 
the accounting officer understands the conditions 
required via Managing Public Money.  
• Although the working relationship between the SLC 
and the department has improved, there has been a 
‘disconnect’ and a lack of alignment on certain issues 
or mutual understanding of each other’s contexts 
G/A 
Assurance Partnerships work well when departments 
adopt a proportionate approach to 
assurance, based on the ALB’s purpose 
and a mutual understanding of risk. ALBs 
have robust governance arrangements in 
place and departments give them 
autonomy to deliver effectively. MI exists to 
enable assessment of performance.  
 
• The sponsorship team does have assurance protocols 
in place. The Performance, Risk and Finance forum is 
in the process of being renewed to provide greater 
scrutiny 
• There have been issues of lack of understanding of 
the proper use of control delegations   
• SLC is currently in the process of implementing a 
‘three lines of defence’ model and aligning its risk 
management capability with industry best practice. 
Parallel to this, SLC has been working with DfE to 
improve risk governance between the Company and 
the Department, specifically, on the formal escalation 
procedures between SLC and DfE register(s) 
A 
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Principle Summary Review findings RAG 
rating 
• A more comprehensive Risk Performance Framework 
needs to be developed  
Value Partnerships work well when departments 
and ALBs share skills and experience to 
enhance their impact and deliver more 
effectively. ALBs contribute to policy 
making and broader departmental priorities. 
There is a focus on innovation and working 
together to deliver VFM.  
 
• There has been limited exchange of skills and 
experience between the department and SLC, for 
example through secondments or joint programmes.  
• Further action should be taken to provide the SLC and 
department with opportunities to share learning and 
expertise, through secondments or ‘staff swaps.’ This 
would also provide the SLC with the opportunity to gain 
insight into the policy-making process 
• The policy commissioning process also needs to be 
transformed to promote more effective and informed 
product development  
A/R 
Engagement Partnerships work well when relationships 
between departments and ALBs are open, 
honest, and constructive and based on 
trust. There is mutual understanding about 
each other’s objectives and clear 
expectations about the terms of 
engagement.  
 
• The Framework document sets out the terms of 
engagement between the SLC and shareholders, 
outlining the process to resolve disputes 
• The Department and SLC recently worked closely 
together to induct the new CEO/CFO, clear the first 
pay business case and develop the Transformation 
Programme business case   
• The sponsorship team and the SLC should ensure 
that the minimum annual requirements for the 
Framework document are met, embedding a clear 
sense of the expectations on mutual engagement. The 
Department and SLC should also have clear 
structures in place to review their relationship 
periodically 
G/A 
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Annex F – Challenges with the policy commissioning cycle  
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Annex G – Example set of strategic objectives for the SLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Right service - A sector leading customer experience, offering digitised, easy to use, accessible platforms and services which 
pays and collects the right amount of money (and appropriate IAG) to students, re-payers, HEIs/FEIs and other key partners
Right objectives - Company aligned to a clear set of objectives - endorsed by wider stakeholders – which are embedded into 
business practices and drive strategic focus   
Right governance - A well-functioning  governance arrangement with all key players understanding their responsibilities and 
the expectations of the SLC as both as a company and NDPB, with the Board/ELT/shareholders/sponsors confident in being 
able to enact their fiduciary responsibilities; hold the company to account drive strategic improvement/performance and 
remain compliant with civil service codes ;and practices e.g. Managing Public Money 
Right IT - A modern, flexible, secure IT system which can quickly absorb and embed new requests and provides stability of 
service; accessibility for operators; flexibility of application;  ease/accuracy of data management; and security against attacks 
or systems failures    
Right staff - Highly engaged staff with the right mix of skills and experience and an effective balance of retention, progression 
and fluidity/partner support within a supportive and professional culture  
Right commissions – An effective policy commissioning cycle which embeds cross team working based on a shared 
language/understanding and operating on well adhered to commercial principles, with enough flexibility to respond 
appropriately to political changes  
Right model - An efficient business model which drives value for money and has the right portfolio of in house and outsourced 
functions, supported by professional corporate services  
Right resilience – A stable, secure operating environment, carrying an appropriate level of risk appetite with robust and well 
managed risk assessment and mitigation protocols 
Long term strategic objectives for SLC 
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Annex H – Critical activity for the next 4 years  
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